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I. INTRODUCTION
The Congress of the United States currently is subject to a
restraining order against exercising the enforcement powers granted
it under the Fourteenth Amendment except in compliance with the
Supreme Court's novel doctrine of 'congruence and proportionality.'
Asserting its exclusive prerogative to define the substance of rights
guaranteed by section 1 of the Amendment, the Court, in a five-to-
four opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores,' decreed that only remedial
or prophylactic measures are "appropriate legislation" under Section
5.2 Congress is no longer permitted to wander the judicial province
hoping to alter the scope and meaning of judicially determined rights
in the guise of enacting enforcement legislation. However, the Court
acknowledges that "it is not easy to discern" the line that separates
"substantive" legislation from what the Court might recognize as
"remedial or preventive" measures.' The Court's newly-minted
congruence and proportionality test is specifically designed to provide
the needed certainty and precision to the task of line-drawing.
The Court has steadfastly adhered to the City of Boerne mandate
that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. Lacking such connection, legislation may become substantive in
operation and effect."' But no congressional enforcement legislation
that has come up for the Court's consideration since City of Boerne
has survived the congruence and proportionality test.' Instead of
1. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
2. The Enforcement Clause reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
3. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
4. Id. at 520.
5. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Coll. Savings
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(Violence Against Women Act of 1994); and Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v.
[Vol. 29:4
functioning as predicted, as a tool to aid the line-drawing, the test has
become an impenetrable wall that separates Congress from the
claimed province of the judiciary. The test is "inherently vague"6 and
is "clothed with all the menace of an essentially arbitrary standard."7
Even though the lethality of the test to the enforcement powers of
Congress has been amply demonstrated, the Court has neither
defined the precise meaning and parameters of the test' nor cared to
tell Congress the exact degree of congruence and proportionality that
is constitutionally required to sustain an enforcement legislation.9 Is
there any reason for the Court to believe that the scope and meaning
of the proportionality test are so self-evident that further clarification
is unnecessary? If not, what could be the Court's rationale for leaving
the test undefined and open-ended, keeping Congress wondering
whether its next enforcement legislation comports with the stringent
requirements of the test? Or, as many thoughtful commentators have
come to suspect, is the proportionality test a custom-made device for
invalidating national civil rights legislation that is unappealing to the
Rehnquist majority of the Court? This article attempts to explore
these questions in some detail.
Part II examines the meaning of the congruence and
proportionality test as perceived by commentators and deciphered
from judicial opinions. Part III is an assessment of the Rehnquist
majority's opinion about the test as expressed in the context of its
application to the Eighth Amendment, and concludes that these
Justices never believed that proportionality could be an objective and
viable constitutional standard. Part IV analyzes the Court's opinion
in University of Alabama v. Garrett in which the Rehnquist majority
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Americans With Disabilities Act). The Court held that the
congressional enforcement legislation involved in each of the above cases failed to meet
the congruence and proportionality test.
6. Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 743, 746 (1998); Note, Section 5 and the Protection of Nonsuspect Classes After
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1542, 1558 (1998); Neal Devins, How Not to
Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 656 (1998) ("Flores settled on an
extraordinarily amorphous standard. ); Garrett Epps, Symposium, The Wrong
Vampire, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 455, 456 (1999) (quoting Dean Aviam Saifer that the City
of Boerne opinion is a "poor piece of judicial craftsmanship").
7. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 481 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Anatomy of an Affirmative Duty to Protect: 42 U.S.C.
Section 1986, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 461, 500 (1999) ("Nowhere does the Court
elaborate on the meaning of the 'congruence and proportionality' standard.").
9. Laycock, supra note 6, at 746 ("[T]he litigation process is probably incapable of
producing good data on the proportions the Court seems to require.").
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used the proportionality standard to protect state sovereignty by
invalidating the enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act
against the states. Part IV demonstrates that this concern for state
sovereignty is at its zenith when it pertains to state discrimination
against the disabled and at its nadir when it comes to state
commercial discrimination. Finally, the article reaches the
unavoidable conclusion that the congruence and proportionality test
is the most demanding test known to constitutional law - and the
Court has never cared to articulate specifically what it demands. The
test is so fundamentally elusive and nonviable that it can only serve as
a convenient vehicle for promoting the subjective views and personal
philosophies of the five adhering Justices.
II. Approximating the Meaning of Proportionality
The congruence and proportionality test is a judicial mirage,
appearing to some scholars as strict scrutiny, ° and to others as
intermediate scrutiny" or something close to it.'2  In spite of their
proclivity for comparing the proportionality test to the familiar
standards of judicial scrutiny, the scholarly commentators fail to
pinpoint the reach and parameters of the test.3 And this failure is not
without reason, for the City of Boerne proportionality test is a strange
intruder in the equal protection household. It has neither referents in
extant judicial precedents," nor grounding in the text or history of the
10. Post & Siegal, supra note 7, (stating that the Court imposes on congressional
enforcement power tight "restrictions that seem analogous to the narrow tailoring
required by strict scrutiny.").
11. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 166 (1997) ("In effect, the Boerne Court
replaced something akin to 'rational basis scrutiny' with a narrow tailoring requirement
typical of intermediate scrutiny.").
12. Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism and the ADA: State Sovereign Immunity
from Private Damage Suits After Boerne, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 481, 495
(1998) (The congruence and proportionality test "is more demanding than the rational
basis test.").
13. Id. ("[TJhe states must now meet this more demanding 'congruence and
proportionality' test. The real challenge lies in determining what the Court meant by
'congruence and proportionality."'); Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1629, 1648-49 (2000) ("This congruence and proportionality test
appears to be something more than rational basis scrutiny, and the critical question is just
how strictly the Court will apply the test.").
14. Fisher, supra note 8, at 500 ("Nowhere does the Court elaborate on the meaning
of the 'congruence and proportionality' standard. Its purpose of protecting against
congressional overreaching is apparent, but it lacks referents in existing caselaw, rendering
it susceptible to a variety of interpretations.").
[Vol. 29:4HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
INCONGRUENT DISPROPORTIONALITY
Fourteenth Amendment. The coupling of "congruence" with
"proportionality" has rendered the meaning of the test even
murkier. 5
"Congruence" is not an uncommon word in the vocabulary of
Supreme Court decisions. The word has been used to convey the idea
of "similarity, '' 16 "comparability,'"' or "nexus. ' ' 18 But occasionally the
Court has used congruence as a synonym for "identicalness" or
"sameness."' 9 In Adarand Constructors v. Pena,z° the Court chose the
15. Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1373 (2000) ("I think the Court's stricter 'congruence and
proportionality' test lacks solid constitutional grounding. Certainly Section 5's
requirement of 'appropriate' legislation does not dictate uniquely heightened scrutiny;
both the text of Section 5 and its drafting and legislative history strongly suggest that the
Framers intended to incorporate the same means-end test that Chief Justice Marshall
articulated when construing the Necessary and Proper Clause and implied Article I
powers in McCulloch v. Maryland.").
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (O'Connor, J., writing for the
majority) ("As we explained more fully in Carrier, this congruence between the standards
for appellate and trial default reflects our judgment that concerns for finality and comity
are virtually identical regardless of the timing of the defendant's failure to comply with
legitimate .... ); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlan, 473 U.S. 234, 286-287 (1985)
(Powell, J., writing for the majority) ("The congruence of language suggests that the
Amendment was intended simply to adopt the narrow view of the state-citizen and state-
alien diversity clauses."); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 32 (1984) (White, J., writing for
the majority) ("Whatever the congruence or lack thereof, of the offenses charged, the
post-appeal felony indictment poses 'the danger that the State might be retaliating against
the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction."'); Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30, 53 (1983)
(Brennan, J., writing for the majority) ("Many other courts, not directly addressing the
congruence of compensatory and punitive thresholds, have held that punitive damages are
available on the same showing of fault as is required by the underlying tort...").
17. Carl Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 23 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., writing for
the majority)("The Government compares the State's interest in video poker licenses to a
patent holder's interest in a patent that she has not yet licensed. Although it is true that
both involve the right to exclude, we think the congruence ends there.").
18. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (Brennan, J., writing for the majority)
("In light of the weak congruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that
gender purported to represent, it was necessary that the legislature choose either to realize
their substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying
those instances where the sex-centered generalization actually comported with fact.");
lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 782 (1975) ("The classic Wharton's Rule offenses -
adultery, incest, bigamy, duelling - are crimes that are characterized by the general
congruence of the agreement and the completed substantive offenses.").
19. Brecheen v. Oklahoma, 485 U.S. 909, 912 (1988) ("But the influences that might
impair the truth-seeking function of the jury in guilt determinations are not identical to
those that impinge on its responsibility to administer fairly the death penalty. This case
demonstrates that lack of congruence."); United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 740-
41 (1982) ("But the differences between an employee and one of these constractors are
crucial. The congruence of professional interests between the contractors and the Federal
Government... have been created for limited and carefully defined purposes.");
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word "congruence" to express the key proposition that "Equal
Protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment., 2' Two dissenting Justices in
Adarand understood the "Court's concept of 'congruence"' as an
assumption "that there is no significant difference between a decision
by the Congress of the United States to adopt an affirmative action
program and such a decision by a State or municipality., 2  The City of
Boerne Court declared that in order for it to treat preventive rules as
"appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence
between the means used and the ends to be achieved, 23 but it did not
provide a clue as to the sense in which the word 'congruence' was
used. The meaning of the word is rendered even less certain by the
City of Boerne Court's earlier statement that "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end., 24  The two
statements read together call into question not only whether the
means-end fit required by the Court is a component of
'proportionality,' 'congruence,' or both, but also whether the
requirement is a condition for the appropriateness of 'preventive
measures,' 'remedial measures,' or both.
This lack of specificity about the meaning and significance of
'congruence' has been a source of considerable confusion. While
some commentators understand 'congruence' as requiring "a tight fit
between the wrong to be prevented and the means to be adopted, 25
some others think that "proportionality evidently relates means and
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999) (Thomas, J., writing for the
majority) ("First, it ignores the identity of interests between attorney and client. The
effective congruence of those interests counsels against treating attorneys like other non-
parties for the purpose of appeal.").
20. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
21. Id. at 201. The Court stated that its prior cases had established three propositions.
The first was "scepticism," the second was "consistency," "[a]nd third, congruence: 'Equal
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Id. at 223-24.
22. Id. at 249 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
23. 521 U.S. at 530.
24. Id. at 520.
25. Thomas W. Beimers, Searching for the Structural Vision of City of Boerne v.
Flores: Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the New Constitutional Architecture, 26
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 789, 803 (1999) ("In essence, 'congruence' requires a tight fit
between the wrong to be prevented and the means to be adopted, while 'proportionality'
requires that the invasive degree or scope of legislation correspond to the degree or scope
of the constitutional wrong .... ).
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ends, 26 or even that "the requirement of congruence does not add
anything to the requirement of proportionality."27  Viewed in the
factual context of City of Boerne, congruence seems to require that
congressional enforcement legislation be strictly targeted to remedy
or prevent state conduct that the Court recognizes as constitutional
wrongs.28 Of course, such a rigid construction of 'congruence' facially
contradicts the City of Boerne Court's statement that "[l]egislation
which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the
sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into




In subsequent cases, the Court has apparently used 'congruence'
and 'proportionality' as interchangeable terms without demarcating
their respective spheres of operation, or simply used them as siamese
twins-conjointly constituting the 'congruence and proportionality'
test. This is how the Court applied the test in Florida Prepaid, in
which it struck down the Patent Remedy Act as "inappropriate"
legislation. The Patent Remedy Act was designed to prevent States
from depriving patent owners of property without due process of law
26. Fisher, supra note 8, at 500-01 (1999) ("Notwithstanding the ambiguities,
however, one may ascertain certain likely meanings of the standards. First,
proportionality evidently relates means and ends, requiring an appropriate balance
between the seriousness of the legislative goal and the intrusiveness and efficacy of the
legislative means to accomplish that goal. The meaning of congruence is less clear;
presumably it refers to the relationship between the class of potential defendants and the
particular evil the legislation seeks to eradicate."); Cedric Merlin Powell, The Scope of
National Power and the Centrality of Religion, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 711-12 (2000)
("While the Court offers no definition for the terms, 'proportionality' and 'congruence,'
they appear to mean that Congress' legislation under Section 5, must be based on
particularized findings of intentional discrimination so that the 'remedy' fits the
constitutional violation (proportionality).").
27. Laycock, supra note 6, at 748 (arguing that the City of Boerne Court's recognition
of the validity of the holding in Katzenbach v. Morgan (384 U.S. 641 (1966)), in which the
Court accepted a voting rights remedy for a violation pertaining to the failure to provide a
public service, suggests the redundancy of congruence in the 'congruence and
proportionality' test). This is the grounds on which the circuit courts have upheld
applicability to states of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). See, e.g., Siler-Khodr v.
Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 694
(2002).
28. Thane Somerville, The Equal Pay Act as Appropriate Legislation Under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can State Employees be Sued?, 76 WASH. L. REV. 279, 287
(2001) (arguing that under the congruence and proportionality test, "the substantive rights
Congress gives to litigants through section 5 legislation must be substantially similar to the
rights litigants would have if they brought suit under the Constitution.").
29. 521 U.S. at 518 (acknowledging prior holding of the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
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by pleading sovereign immunity in federal court patent actions.30
First, the Court claimed that congressional failure to identify a
"pattern of patent infringement by the States"3 or "widespread and
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights 3 2  rendered the
provisions of the statute "out of proportion to [the] supposed
remedial or preventive object."33  The Court wasted no time in
making the next fundamentally conflicting claim that "[a]n unlimited
range of state conduct would expose a State to claims of direct,
induced, or contributory patent infringement" under the statute
because, as the congressional record showed, "'it[']s difficult to
identify a patented product or process which might not be used by a
state."'34 The Court then faulted Congress for subjecting the States,
for an indefinite duration, to liability for unintentional violations
regardless of the existence of state-court remedies. The Court
claimed that such "indiscriminate scope... is particularly
incongruous in light of the scant support for the predicate
unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy."36
Under the analysis of the Florida Prepaid Court, the lack of a
pattern of constitutional violations causes the lack of proportionality
and the indiscriminate scope of the statute is rendered "particularly
incongruous" by this lack of proportionality. 'Congruence' and
proportionality' serve as dependent and mutually nourishing
30. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999). The Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent
Remedy Act), 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a), Pub. L. 102-560, was designed "to provide a
uniform remedy for patent infringement and to place States on the same footing as private
parties under that regime."
31. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
32. Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). The Court blamed Congress
for enacting the legislation "in response to a handful of instances of state patent
infringement that do not necessarily violate the Constitution." Id. at 645-46. The Court
gave no consideration to the congressional finding that state infringement of patents was
likely to increase; instead, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court dismissed the findings
as an effort "to head off this speculative harm." Id. at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One
can only wonder what happened to the Court's promise in City of Boerne that Congress'
enforcement legislation could aim at remedying or preventing state conduct that itself
might not be unconstitutional.
33. Id. at 646.
34. Id. (quoting H. R. Rep. at 38).
35. Id. at 647. The response of the dissenting Justices was that adjudication of
infringement cases by state courts against state entities "would raise questions of




concepts even though proportionality is concerned primarily with
discerning the pattern of constitutional violation while congruence is
primarily concerned with the scope of the statute's coverage.
However, the four dissenting Justices maintained that both the issues
of 'pattern' and 'pervasiveness' belonged to the province of
'congruence.' Justice Stevens asserted, in dissent, that the City of
Boerne Court found no congruence in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act "both because of the absence of evidence of
widespread violations that were in need of redress and because the
sweeping coverage of the statute ensured 'its intrusion at every level
of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of
almost every description and regardless of subject matter."'37
The Court again applied the congruence and proportionality test
when it invalidated the extension of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) to state agencies in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents. 38 To achieve its desired outcome in the case, the
Court first immunized the States from liability for most age
discrimination by declaring that "States may discriminate on the basis
of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age
classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest., 39 This cleared the way for the Court to blame Congress for
a "failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination"' and then condemn the extension of the ADEA "to
the States [as] an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential
problem."'" However, .the Court's inability to delineate the roles of
congruence and proportionality has lingered. While it adverted to the
37. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 662 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532) (emphasis
added).
38. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
39. Id. at 83. The Court stated that, under its precedents, "age classification is
presumptively rational." Id. at 84.
40. Id. at 91.
41. Id. at 89. The regular four dissenting Justices, led by Justice Stevens, maintained
that "[flederal rules outlawing discrimination in the workplace, like the regulation of
wages and hours or health and safety standards, may be enforced against public as well as
private employers." Id. at 93 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting). In their opinion, Congress could extend the ADEA by virtue of its commerce
power to regulate American economy, including the private and public sectors of the labor
market. Therefore, the question of abrogation of state sovereign immunity by legislation
enacted under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not even pertinent to the case.
The dissenters refused to accept as binding precedent Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (in which the Rehnquist majority held that legislation enacted under Congress' Article
I powers would not abrogate state sovereign immunity) because the case was "profoundly
misguided." Id. at 97.
Summer 2002] INCONGRUENT DISPROPORT1ONALITY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
same congruence and proportionality test it applied in Florida
Prepaid when it concluded that the ADEA was not "appropriate
[enforcement] legislation,"42 the Court did not elaborate on the
'congruence' concept. Instead, the Court emphasized that the
"substantive requirements the ADEA imposes on state and local
governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct
that conceivably could be targeted by the Act."43 Therefore, if the
focus of 'congruence' is the fit between means and ends, as the Court
originally envisioned in City of Boerne," then the statement in Kimel
simply means that the ADEA's congruence is disproportionate.
The role and significance of 'congruence' has become
increasingly indistinct and amorphous with each successive
application of the congruence and proportionality test by the
Supreme Court. Since City of Boerne, the Court has not articulated
the place of "congruence" in the test. The Court's wide-ranging
proportionality inquiry seems to encompass congruence because
without the requisite nexus between means and ends, the legislation
will fail to satisfy the requirement of proportionality. Instead of
excising the seemingly redundant 'congruence' from the equation, the
Court seems to have consolidated congruence and proportionality
into a single integrated requirement of proportionality without
announcing that it was doing so. The Court's decision in Garrett is a
telling illustration. While invalidating the applicability of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to the States, the Court stated that
"in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages
against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the
States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy
imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the
targeted violation."45 Recall that, in Florida Prepaid, the 'pattern'
requirement belonged to proportionality 6 and that congruence, by
definition, needed no assistance from proportionality to assess the
means-end fit.
Whether seen as a yardstick to measure the scope of a statute or
42. Id. at 82-83.
43. Id. at 83. The Court's statement was a reversal of the role assigned to
proportionality in Florida Prepaid, namely, the search for a pattern of constitutional
violations.
44. The City of Boerne Court stated: "While preventive rules are sometimes
appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and
the ends to be achieved ..... 521 U.S. at 530.
45. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority).
46. See supra notes 32-37, supra and accompanying text.
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a gauge of the degree of nexus between means and ends,
proportionality has emerged as the dominant, if not the sole, criterion
for the constitutionality of congressional enforcement legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court has repeatedly
struck down Congress' remedial legislation for lack of conformity
with the proportionality test, it has conspicuously failed to articulate
clearly the meaning of the test or to craft objective guidelines for
Congress to follow in order to fulfill the test's requirements whatever
they may be.
As a result, one of the most troubling challenges facing our
elected national leaders in both political branches is how to solve the
pressing problem of prejudice and discrimination against certain
segments of the society through remedial legislation and get it past
the Supreme Court's as-yet unarticulated test of proportionality. In
the absence of a court-enunciated meaning for proportionality,
Congress has no choice but to predicate future enforcement
legislation on suppositions and surmises divined from the Court's
various pronouncements pertaining to proportionality in multiple
contexts.47 But one thing Congress assuredly cannot assume is that it
can overcome proportionality scrutiny by enacting remedial
legislation that is unquestionably and demonstrably rational.
Proportionality demands more than rationality. This is how the
Court has described the scope of proportionality as applied to the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A. Takings Clause Proportionality
There is no disagreement among the Justices that "concerns for
proportionality animate the Takings Clause, 48 and that the applicable
standard for review is "rough proportionality. 4 9 The Court explained
the approximate scope of the rough proportionality standard in
Dolan v. City of Tigard." In Dolan, the owner of a plumbing and
electric supply store challenged the city requirement that she dedicate
approximately 15% of the property for public use as a condition for
47. For the Justices' views about the viability of proportionality as a constitutional
test, expressed in the context of the Eighth Amendment, see Part II, infra.
48. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). The
Justices were unanimous on this point.
49. Id. at 733 (Souter, J., joined by O'Connor, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the majority that the rough proportionality
standard is applicable only to excessive exactions). See id. at 703.
50. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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granting a permit to redevelop her store." The property owner
claimed that the conditions imposed by the city forced her to choose
between a redevelopment permit and the right to just compensation
for property taken from her for public use as guaranteed by the
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court agreed with her
contention. 52
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist established a
two-pronged test to decide constitutional challenges to regulatory
takings of private property. First, the Court is to "determine whether
the 'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state interest' and
the permit condition exacted by the city."53 Second, if such a nexus is
found to exist, the Court is to "decide the required degree of
connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the
proposed development."54 The first part of the test can be satisfied by
showing a connection between the adverse effect of the proposed
land use on the public interest and the conditions attached to the
approval of such use.5 Apparently, the city's conditions for dedication
in Dolan satisfied the 'essential nexus' prong because they served the
city's "legitimate interests in minimizing floods and traffic
congestions.""
The second prong of the test requires "individualized
determination" not only "with respect to the nature and the extent of
the relationship between the conditions and the impact," but also
with respect to a demonstration of proportionality. 7 The City of
Tigard failed this requirement. The Court was urged to adopt a
"reasonable relationship" test, as formulated by the majority of state
51. The city claimed that the dedicated portion of the permit applicant's property
should be used as a greenway and for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. Id.
at 379-80.
52. See id. at 385-86. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
53. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837
(1987)).
54. Id. The Court noted that the second inquiry was rendered unnecessary in Nollan
because of the lack of nexus of any kind or degree.
55. Damon Christian Watson, Dolan and the "Rough Proportionality" Standard:
Taking Its Toll on Loretto's Bright Line: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 18
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1995).
56. Dolan, 511 U.S. at 397 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting).
57. Id. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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courts, to establish the requisite degree of nexus. The Court declined
to adopt the term "reasonable relationship," partly because it is
"confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' which describes the
minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."58 Instead, the Court adopted the "rough
proportionality" test, claiming that the term "best encapsulates" the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 9 Five years after Dolan, the
Court in a unanimous decision, strictly limited the "rough
proportionality" part of the test to "excessive exactions. ' 60
Although the rough proportionality test is designed to help
determine the degree of correspondence between an exaction and the
public harm attributable to a development, it fails to specify the ratio
between exaction and harm that is constitutionally sufficient. Despite
the ambiguity concerning the exact level of scrutiny contemplated,
the Court candidly announced that rough proportionality requires
more than rational basis review. 61 The Court confined the reach of
the rough proportionality test to the limited category of land use
regulations that generated claims of excessive exactions. Finally, in
spite of the possibility of quantifying the respective costs of public
harm and exaction in most cases, the Court told land use regulators
that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required," 62 only "some
sort of individualized determination"'63 concerning the relationship
between the exaction and the public harm is needed. Nevertheless,
the test is more specific and has more clearly marked outer limits than
the unqualified proportionality test the Court uses to scrutinize the
constitutionality of congressional enforcement legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court has crafted the 'rough proportionality' test with care
and solicitude toward the police power of states and municipalities, a
58. Id. at 390-91.
59. Id.
60. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999).
61. See John D. Echeverria, Revving the Engines in Neutral: City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10682, 10682 (1999) (stating that the
Dolan test implies a "relatively demanding standard of review"); Christopher J. St. Jeanos,
Note, Dolan v. Tigard and the Rough Proportionality Test: Roughly Speaking, Why Isn't a
Nexus Enough?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1896 (1995) (stating that the "rough
proportionality test is more closely aligned with a 'strict scrutiny' standard.").
62. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
63. Id. ("[T]he city must make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.").
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level of concern that is lacking in the Court's rigorous application of
the "polished proportionality" test to Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation. Even though it is not precisely defined, the
rough proportionality test's boundaries are roughly marked out.
Considering the fact that costs to the opposing interests in regulatory
takings can, in most cases, be measured in dollars and cents, the
Court could have required that the costs of exaction and public harm
be somewhat equivalent to each other or that the exaction be directly
proportional to the harm "specifically and uniquely attributable" to
the development, as some state courts had done.6' The Court ruled
out such options, stating that "the Federal Constitution requires [no]
such exacting scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved"-a
reference to the police powers of states and municipalities.65
The Court's lenient proportionality approach to the Takings
Clause contrasts with the unforgiving application of its undefined and
unqualified proportionality to Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation. If the Court's rough proportionality jurisprudence is any
guide, no enforcement legislation can pass the proportionality test to
qualify as "appropriate" legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, even if it is rationally related to the remedial purpose of
Congress. If rationality review is contrary to the principles of "rough
proportionality," it must be more so under the "polished
proportionality" test. Even though "rough proportionality"
highlights some of the deficiencies of 'polished proportionality' it
does not shed much additional light on the scope or meaning of
Fourteenth Amendment proportionality. It also reminds us that the
concerns of proportionality do not "animate" the Fourteenth
Amendment as they do the Takings Clause.
Il. PUNISHMENTS AND DAMAGES: EIGHTH
AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY
The Court has often tried to provide historical legitimacy to the
proportionality principle by asserting that it is "deeply rooted and
frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence., 6   As a
constitutional standard, "proportionality has been recognized
64. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E. 2d 799,
801 (I11. 1961); Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W. 2d 442, 447 (Wis. 1965).
65. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390.
66. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (1993) (quoting Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,284-85 (1983)).
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explicitly [by the Supreme] Court for almost a century."67  The
standard has been conveniently used as a yardstick to measure the
metes and bounds of the prohibitions embodied in the Eighth
Amendment. Since it is essentially a mathematical principle, the
proportionality standard naturally provides the appearance of
objectivity and accuracy to the Court's determinations of the
excessiveness of bails and fines under the Amendment. 8 However,
the utility of the standard for expounding the non-quantifiable
concept of "cruel and unusual punishment"" is highly questionable.
Nevertheless, nowhere else has the Court used the principle of
proportionality so consistently, and often improvidently, as in the
context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
A. Cruel And Unusual Punishment Clause
1. The Evolution of Proportionality
For years, the Supreme Court adhered to an anti-torture
interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause ("the
Clause"), which barred only "inhuman and barbarous" punishments
involving "something more than the mere extinguishment of life."7
The Court rejected the occasional entreaties of some eminent Justices
that the Clause be interpreted to prohibit "all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to
offenses charged."'" Presumably, by the force of its own intrinsic
merit, the proportionality principle eventually gained recognition in
the jurisprudence of the Clause. In Weems v. United States,72 the
Court abruptly changed its traditional anti-torture interpretation of
the Clause to include a proportionality requirement,73 making an
67. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,286 (1983).
68. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
69. See id.
70. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (Fuller, J., writing for the majority)
(rejecting an Eighth Amendment challenge to imposition of the death penalty by
electrocution).
71. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). In O'Neil,
Justices Field and Harlan objected to the imposition of long imprisonment for violation of
Vermont's liquor laws. Justice Harlan maintained that the sentence was excessive. Id. at
370 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
73. Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, acknowledged that "[w]hat constitutes a
cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided. It has been said that
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emphatic statement that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportional to offense. 74 By virtue
of the new interpretation, the Weems Court ruled that a fifteen-year
imprisonment including hard and painful labor for the crime of
falsifying a public record was "cruel in its excessiveness and unusual
in its character.,
75
Almost half a century later, the Court in Trop v. Dulles76 relied
on the Weems interpretation of the Clause to invalidate a statute that
authorized a military court to revoke the citizenship of a soldier and
render him stateless as a penalty for wartime desertion. The plurality
opinion of Chief Justice Warren maintains that denationalization "is a
form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for
the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development. ''17  The Chief Justice sought to ground the
proportionality requirement on a solid philosophical justification,
befitting the civility of our constitutional democracy, by declaring that
"[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""
The impact of this statement on judicial perspectives has been so
profound that it has become part of the proportionality discourse in
subsequent cases."
The proportionality principle appeared to be established as an
indispensable component of the Clause when seven Justices treated it
as such in Coker v. GeorgiaY' In that case, the Court overturned the
capital sentence of a serial rapist, imposed by the Georgia State
ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like." Id. at
368 (citing McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899)). However, the Justice,
emphasizing the evolving nature of the meaning of the Clause, stated: "Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Id. at
373.
74. Id. at 367.
75. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J., joined by
Black, Douglas, & Wittaker, JJ.) (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 349).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 101.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (O'Connor, J., writing for the
majority); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (Marshall, J., writing for the
majority); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 292 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976) (Stewart, J., writing for the majority).
80. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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courts, on the ground that death was a disproportionate punishment
for the crime of raping an adult woman. This was despite the fact that
the convict raped three separate women within the space of three
years, killing one, attempting to kill another, and victimizing the third
while he was on the run from the state prison where he was serving a
sentence of several consecutive life-terms."' The Court embraced the
holding of prior cases that "the Eighth Amendment bars not only
those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are
'excessive' in relation to the crime committed,"82 and established the
rule that a punishment would be excessive if it "makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.., or is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime." 3 In applying the standard,
the Court sought guidance "from the objective evidence of the
country's present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a
penalty for rape of an adult woman"' and found that only Georgia
authorized such a sentence while two other jurisdictions provided for
capital punishment when the victim is a child.85 The plurality opinion
of Justice White concedes that providing for the death penalty in
murder cases is not necessarily cruel or excessive but maintains that
rape, "in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and
to the public, does not compare with murder,"86 and therefore "death
is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult
woman."
87
Mirroring society's increasing concern over crime-a concern
81. Id. at 607 (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion)(White, J., joined by Stewart, Blackmun &
Stevens, JJ.)(citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); and Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910)).
83. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
84. Id. at 593.
85. Id. at 595-96. Emphasizing that, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court's plurality paid
attention to the "climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a
particular punishment," Justice White asserted that "[i]t is thus not irrelevant here that
out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty
for rape where death did not ensue." Id. at 596 n.10 (citing United Nations, Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment 40, 86 (1968)).
86. 433 U.S. at 598.
87. Id. at 597 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice
Powell agreed with the plurality that "ordinarily death is disproportionate punishment for
the crime of raping an adult woman." Id. at 601. Justices Brennan and Marshall
maintained that the "death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 600 (Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., concurring in the judgment).
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fueled by the "tough on crime" rhetoric of vote-seeking politicians88-
the conservative Justices of the Supreme Court began to question the
constitutional propriety of proportionality review of excessive
criminal punishments. In Rummel v. Estelle,9 the Court declined to
invalidate a life sentence imposed on a recidivist who had been
convicted of three non-violent property offenses involving a total of
$229.11.' Writing for a bare majority of the Court, then Justice
Rehnquist declared that "[o]utside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences
have been exceedingly rare"91 and that for crimes "punishable by
significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of
the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative. ' '12  Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, after a lengthy
analysis of the history and rationale of the Eighth Amendment and
relevant precedent, concluded that a mandatory life sentence for
defrauding persons of about $230 would be viewed as grossly unjust
by lawyers and laymen alike and that it "crosse[d] any rationally
drawn line separating punishment that lawfully may be imposed from




The Rummel Court left the states free, without being constrained
by any Eighth Amendment principle, to punish any offense with any
88. Adam M. Gershowitz, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishment and
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1253-54 (2000) (arguing that
excessive and abusive sentences are not susceptible to legislative scrutiny and oversight
because criminals are a reviled group in American politics who have no effective lobbyists
and because legislators compete to be the toughest on crime).
89. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
90. The crimes were (1) fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of
goods or services; (2) passing a forged check for $28.36; and (3) obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses. Id. at 265-66.
91. Id. at 272. The conservative Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, White, and Chief Justice
Burger were joined by Justice Blackmun.
92. Id. at 274. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion practically ruled out
proportionality review in all non-capital sentences. However, the Justice, in responses to
Justice Powell's dissent, conceded that if a statute levied a mandatory life sentence for
overtime parking, the proportionality principle would "come into play." Id. at 274 n.11.
But such proportionality review in non-capital cases would occur, if at all, only in extreme
cases. Justice Rehnquist claimed that Weems involved such an extreme case, one in which
a twelve-year confinement in a penal institution, "with chain at the ankle and wrist of the
offender, hard and painful labor" and other ancillary punishments was the sentence for the
trivial offense of falsifying a public record. Id. at 273-74 (quoting Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910)).
93. Rummell, 445 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
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non-capital sentence "as long as the punishment arguably promotes
some penological purpose."'94 The Court seemed to adhere to and
apply the new rule with merciless rigidity95 until a new majority of the
Court, led by Justice Powell, succeeded in rehabilitating the
proportionality principle in Solem v. Helm,96 a case involving a claim
of an excessive prison sentence remarkably similar to that in Rummel.
In Solem, the defendant Helm was convicted in 1979 for writing a
$100 bad check and sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility
of parole under South Dakota's felony recidivist statute.97  By the
time of the conviction, Helm, "a 36-year-old man.., had spent a
good part of the previous 15 years in the state penitentiary"98 for
committing an assortment of non-violent offenses such as burglary,
grand larceny, obtaining money under false pretenses, and driving
while intoxicated. Even though the offenses for which Helm was
convicted included six felonies, "they were all non-violent, none was a
crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in each
case." 99 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, invalidated Helm's
life sentence, holding that "as a matter of principle... a criminal
sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant
has been convicted"' "° and that Helm's sentence was "significantly
disproportionate to his crime and therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.. '...
Emphasizing the need for objective criteria, Justice Powell
mandated that a court analyzing a disproportionality claim should be
guided by empirical factors, "including, (i) the gravity of the offense
94. Martin R. Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth
Amendment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J.
1103, 1131 (1980).
95. Two years after Rummel, the Court, in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per
curiam), refused a proportionality review of a forty-year prison sentence and $20,000 fine
imposed on a defendant convicted of possession with intent to distribute of nine ounces of
marijuana. In dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens argued that the penalty
was "grossly unjust" and excessive compared with penalties set for similar offenses in the
very same state. Id. at 384-86.
96. Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The majority in Solem consisted of the four Justices
who dissented in Rummel and Justice Blackmun, who voted with the Majority in Rummel,
but changed his mind and voted for the proportionality principle as articulated by Justice
Powell in Solem.
97. Id. at 281-82.
98. State v. Helm, 287 N.W. 2d 497,499 (S.D. 1980) (Morgan, J., dissenting).
99. Solem, 463 U.S. at 280.
100. Id. at 290.
101. Id. at 303.
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and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."' 2  Applying
these objective criteria to Helm's sentence, the Justice concluded that
it failed the proportionality test. °3 However, in an uncompromising
dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, argued that Helm was an incorrigible criminal with a
propensity to commit serious crimes against society and that the
objective criteria the majority utilized to find disproportionality
would inevitably force arbitrary line-drawing by appellate courts
reviewing criminal sentences. The dissenters claimed that the Solem
majority's expressed confidence in their own ability to grade offenses
according to their relative "gravity" amounted to "nothing other than
a bald substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of
the legislature."'" More fundamentally, the dissenters would strictly
limit proportionality review to "extraordinary cases, Weems being
one example and the line of capital cases another."'0 5 The majority
responded, not only with an examination of the development of the
proportionality requirement through a string of precedents, but also
with the simple syllogism that "[i]t would be anomalous indeed if the
lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death were
both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate
punishment of imprisonment were not. ' '
2. Renouncing Proportionality
Even though Justice Powell's proportionality doctrine was well
received and supported by "venerable"'0 7 precedents, it was swept
aside by the new and resolute majority of the Rehnquist Court. The
new majority achieved its goal in Harmelin v. Michigan 8 when it
102. Id. at 292.
103. Justice Powell found that "Helm has received the penultimate sentence for
relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more harshly than other criminals
in the State who have committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more harshly
than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single
state." Id. at 303.
104. Id. at 314 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, Rehnquist, & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
105. Id. at 313.
106. Id. at 289 (citing the parallel textual limitations on excessive bail and fines in the
Eighth Amendment).
107. See Pressly Millen, Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment - Rummel, Solem and
the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DUKE L.J. 789, 790.
108. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
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concluded that a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole
for possession of 672 grams of cocaine, imposed on a person with no
prior felony convictions, was not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded
categorically that "the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee" and that the Court's "5 to 4 decision [in]
Solem was simply wrong.""'s To bolster his conclusion, Scalia traced
the origin of the Amendment to a parallel provision in the 1689
English Declaration of Rights,"' examined the evidence available
from the state conventions that ratified the Bill of Rights,"' and cited
actions of the First Congress that "belie any doctrine of
proportionality.
112
Justice Scalia asserted that the Eighth Amendment was designed
to focus exclusively on the methods of punishment, not on excessive
or disproportionate punishments."3 In his reading, the Amendment
would not prohibit a punishment for its cruelty unless it is also "as the
text... requires.., unusual."'14  Nevertheless, Scalia, responding to
the forceful arguments of seven concurring and dissenting Justices,
conceded that the language of the Amendment "bears the
construction" that would "make the provision a form of
proportionality guarantee." '' That was precisely the point of Justice
Powell's majority opinion in Solem. Despite his strident rejection of
Solem, Scalia shied away from confronting Powell's argument that it
109. Id. at 965. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, but the part of his
opinion that totally rejected the proportionality principle was joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, wrote an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens and
Marshall dissented.
110. Id. at 966.
111. Id. at 979.
112. Id. at 980.
113. Id. at 973-74.
114. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967. The textual analysis of Justice Scalia's opinion reveals
more of his penological disposition than his reasoned method for constitutional
interpretation. According to his logic, if an American citizen's face were disfigured by
acid, on charges of immorality of some kind brought by an adherent of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and the individual responsible for the disfigurement were brought to justice
in the U.S. courts, he could argue that his crime may be disproportionately cruel, but not
unusual in Afghanistan now nor was it unusual at the time of the adoption of our Bill of
Rights.
115. Id. at 976. Justice Scalia was also forced to concede that proportionality may be a
concern for capital punishment, which he said: "differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind." Id. at 995 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 306 (1972)(Stewart, J., concurring)).
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would be absurd to construe the Eighth Amendment to bar the
greater punishment of death and the lesser punishments of excessive
fines and bail but not the intermediate category of an excessive and
disproportionate sentence of imprisonment.
The concurring Justices carefully distanced themselves from the
radical views of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia."6 Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Souter, fashions a "narrow proportionality principle""' 7 for the Eighth
Amendment that "forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime." ' Claiming that the precise contours
of proportionality recognized by prior decisions remained unclear,
Justice Kennedy discerned "some common principles""' 9 that guide
proportionality review. These principles recognize, inter alia, the
prerogative of legislatures to make a variety of penological
judgments, the value of the federal system, and the need to guide
proportionality review by objective factors."O Justice Kennedy's lean
proportionality principle "does not require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence,"''2 ' but only a threshold determination of
whether a "comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality"'
22
warranting further inter-jurisdictional or intra-jurisdictional
comparative analysis. The primary function of such a rare
comparative analysis is to validate a conclusion of gross
disproportionality that has already been reached.'23
116. By not espousing Justice Scalia's absolute rejection of the Eighth Amendment
proportionality guarantee, the concurring Justices not only escaped self-inflicted
embarrassment for the unjustified rejection of a long-standing constitutional principle but
also did a great service to the cause of conservatism and the prestige of the Supreme
Court. See Bruce Campbell, Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment: Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 284 (1992) (surmising that
Scalia's failure to fully explain the seriousness of the crime involved in Harmelin "is likely
to erode popular support for a Supreme Court already under scrutiny for its firm
conservative commitment" and that the "recent manifestation of a 'conservative
counterrevolution' may also offend the sensibilities of more 'traditional' judicial
conservatives who believe that the Court should give some deference to precedents that
have recognized a narrow proportionality guarantee." Id. at 295).
117. 501 U. S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 1001.
119. Id. at 998.
120. Id. at 998-1001.
121. Id. at 1001.
122. Id. at 1005.
123. Justice Kennedy asserted that "[t]he proper role for comparative analysis of
sentences, then, is to validate an initial judgment that a sentence is grossly
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Justice Kennedy's gross disproportionality principle does not
appear to be substantively different from Justice Scalia's anti-
proportionality principle. Despite their seemingly divergent
constitutional interpretations, both Justices arrived at the same
conclusion-that Harmelin's life sentence without parole did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Kennedy's
"standardless test ' 24 may not be appropriate for producing objective
outcomes because at the center of his review methodology is the
subjective judicial determination of gross disproportionality, and
because most of the so-called objective factors he mentioned come
into play only after that critical threshold determination has been
made. This methodological flaw permitted Justice Kennedy to make
his own subjective judgment in the case, even though, as Justice
White stated eloquently in dissent, Harmelin's sentence was grossly
out of proportion to sentences for any other comparable crime in
Michigan 12' and "only Alabama provides a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a first-time
offender, and then only when a defendant possesses 10 kilograms or
,,126
more of cocaine.
Four dissenters, led by Justice White, castigated the theories of
Justices Scalia and Kennedy alike. The dissenters dismissed Justice
Scalia's assertion that "the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee."'27  They arrayed an impressive list of
established precedents, from Weems to Solem, in which the Court had
recognized the general principle that a punishment may offend the
Eighth Amendment at any given time if it is contrary to the standards
of decency of contemporary American society-standards to be
measured by objective factors, rather than by the judiciary's
disproportionate to a crime," which he predicted would occur only in "rare cases." Id. at
1005. Astonishingly, he calls this review "objective." Id. at 1000-01.
124. G. David Hackney, A Trunk Full of Trouble: Harmelin v. Michigan, III S. Ct.
2680 (1991), 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 262, 274 (1992).
125. 501 U.S. at 1023-25 (White, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
Justice Marshall joined the dissent with a caveat that, in his opinion, a death sentence is
per se unconstitutional.
126. Id. at 1026 (emphasis omitted). Justice Kennedy, in the concluding paragraph of
his opinion, accepted the reality that "[a] penalty as severe and unforgiving as the one
imposed here would make this a most difficult and troubling case for any judicial officer."
Id. However, he concluded that "[t]he dangers flowing from drug offenses and the
circumstances of the crime committed here demonstrate that the Michigan penalty scheme
does not surpass constitutional bounds." Id. at 1008-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting).
Summer 2002] INCONGRUENT DISPROPORTIONALITY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
subjective conceptions of decency.128 The dissenters argued that the
tripartite proportionality analysis set forth in Solem assesses
objectively "a given sentence's constitutional proportionality, giving
due deference to 'public attitudes concerning a particular
sentence.",129 They blamed the majority for unjustifiably discarding
the sound analytical framework of Solem. In the words of Justice
White, Justice Scalia delivered "a swift death sentence to Solem
[while] Justice Kennedy prefer[red] to eviscerate it, leaving only an
empty shell."'30
3. Offering An Alternative Rationale
Justice Scalia's failure to gain support from more than one of the
Justices who constituted the razor-thin majority in Harmelin
demonstrates the absurdity of his non-proportionality theory. The
historical evidence he marshaled in support of his theory is utterly
lopsided. Realizing this obvious evidentiary weakness, Justice Scalia
offered an alternative and, in some respects, far more convincing
justification for ridding the Amendment of the proportionality
component. He argued that the proportionality principle, as a
constitutional review standard, is so inadequate that it "enable[s]
judges to evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men and women
has considered proportionate-and to say that it is not" and it
"becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective values. 13'
Justice Scalia's disdain for the subjectivity of the proportionality
principle was shared by Chief Justice Rehnquist. In fact, Justice
Scalia was echoing the similar sentiment passionately and eloquently
expressed by the Chief Justice in prior cases. In his majority opinion
in Rummel v. Estelle,"' Justice Rehnquist dismissed Rummel's
"proportionality attack"'33 by claiming that any constitutional
distinction drawn by the Court on the basis of the length of the
legislatively-mandated terms of imprisonment would be, "or appear
to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices."'34 In Solem,
Justice Rehnquist joined the dissenters who chastised the majority of
128. Id. at 1015 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989); and Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
129. Id. at 1021 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592).
130. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018.
131. Id. at 986 (emphasis in the original).
132. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
133. Id. at 277.
134. Id. at 274 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 592).
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the Court for assuming "Solomonic wisdom" '35 in judging the
proportionality of prison sentences. The dissenters emphatically
characterized the majority opinion as one in which the "conclusion by
five Justices that they are able to say that one offense has less 'gravity'
than another is nothing other than a bald substitution of individual
subjective moral values for those of the legislature."'36
Justice Scalia's observation that subjectivity is an inherent
attribute of the proportionality principle cannot be seriously
challenged. What is questionable is his effort to elevate the
subjectivity rationale to such doctrinal heights as to fortify his fragile
no-proportionality theory. The Justice maintained that the
proportionality standard cannot be rendered less subjective by means
of objective factors. To demonstrate his hypothesis, Justice Scalia
took apart the tripartite proportionality analysis of Solem and
discredited each of the objective factors'37 delineated therein as
illustrative of subjective decisionmaking. What is most remarkable
about Justice Scalia's assessment of the proportionality principle is
not so much the assertion that the principle is inherently subjective as
it is the conclusion that it is an incorrigible constitutional standard,
not easily amenable to redemption with the aid of objective factors.
If the proportionality principle is so intrinsically nebulous and
indeterminate as Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice claim, then it
should not be an acceptable standard for constitutional adjudication
in any context.
B. Excessive Fines Clause
For more than two centuries, the Supreme Court assigned
virtually no constitutional role to the Excessive Fines Clause. When
the Court finally decided to resuscitate the moribund Clause, it had
difficulty in determining the meaning of the excessiveness that the
provision was designed to prohibit. Thus, in two 1993 decisions,
135. 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 986-89 (1991). Justice Scalia asserted that the unconfined
subjectivity of the proportionality principle was evident from the subjectivity of the Solem
objective factors: 1) the inherent gravity of the offense, 2) intra-jurisdictional comparison
with sentences imposed for similar offenses, and 3) inter-jurisdictional comparison with
sentences imposed for the same crime. Id. at 986-87. He found no "objective standard" or
criteria for deciding the "gravity" of an offense under the first and second Solem factors.
Id. at 988-89. The Justice claimed that the third Solem factor was subjective and even
inappropriate because diversity in criminal law enforcement is a virtuous hallmark or "the
very raison d'etre of our federal system." Id. at 990.
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Austin v. United States138 and Alexander v. United States,39 the Court
declared that punitive in rem forfeitures and criminal forfeitures are
subject to the constraints of the Excessive Fines Clause. However, the
Court expressly left the task of determining the scope of the
excessiveness prohibited by the Clause to the lower courts.14° Not
surprisingly, the circuit courts came up with divergent tests to assess
constitutional excessiveness under the Clause. 41 Apparently finding
the emerging disagreement among the circuit courts disconcerting,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Bajakajian, decided to adopt
"gross disproportionality" as the optimal yardstick for measuring
excessiveness. 
14 2
At issue in Bajakajian was the applicability of the Excessive
Fines Clause to a government forfeiture of U.S. currency that was
about to be transported out of the country in violation of a criminal
reporting statute. Bajakajian tried to board a flight from the U.S. to
Italy without disclosing that he was carrying more than $357,000 in his
luggage.' He did this after he was informed by customs officials of
his obligation to report cash in amounts equal to or in excess of
$10,000.144 When the officials discovered the concealed amount, they
seized the cash and took Bajakajian into custody. Even though
Bajakajian subsequently pled guilty to willfully violating the reporting
statute,45 the government sought forfeiture of the entire unreported
amount as mandated by the statute." The Supreme Court, in a five-
138. 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding that the Clause barred excessive punitive in rem
forfeiture).
139. 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to criminal
forfeitures).
140. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622-23 ("Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to
consider [the appropriate standard for excessiveness] in the first instance."); Alexander,
509 U.S. at 559 ("We think it preferable that this question [of excessiveness] be addressed
by the Court of Appeals in the first instance.").
141. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying an
"instrumentality test"); United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1994)
(adopting the "proportionality test"); United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d
974 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting a "hybrid test"). For a discussion of these tests, see Melissa
A. Rolland, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, and United
States v. Bajakajian, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1385-88 (1999).
142. 524 U.S. 321, 338 (1998).
143. Id. at 324-25.
144. Id. at 324 (charging violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1994) (requiring the
reporting of the export or import of currency in the amount of $10,000 or more)).
145. 524 U.S. at 325. Bajakajian sought a bench trial on the issue of forfeiture.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 982 mandates forfeiture of the currency involved in a § 5316 reporting
violation. "The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in
[Vol. 29:4
to-four decision, found that the punitive forfeiture constituted a
"fine" that failed to measure up to the requirements of the Excessive
Fine Clause.'47
The Court's majority concluded instinctively that the forfeiture
of Bajakajian's legally earned money for a "mere" reporting
violation' 8 that caused "minimal" harm149 was excessive, especially
when the money was not related to any illegal activities." 0 However,
the majority acknowledged the absence of an articulated standard for
determining the constitutional excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture. 5'
Even though the Court was certain that the "touchstone of the
constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the
principle of proportionality," which requires "some relationship"
between the amount of the forfeiture and "the gravity of the offense
that it is designed to punish,' 52 the Court found no guidance from the
text and history of the Clause on "how disproportional to the gravity
of an offense a fine must be in order to be constitutionally
excessive.""' 3 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
curtly declared "that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines
Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's
offense.""4
Justice Thomas explicitly rejected the standard of: "strict
proportionality" and, instead, adopted the "standard of gross
disproportionality" as articulated in the Court's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause precedents"5 for two crucial and pragmatic policy
violation of [§ 5316] shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property,
real or personal, involved in such an offense, or any property traceable to such property."
18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994).
147. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 344.
148. Id. at 337.
149. Id. at 339 ("The harm that respondent caused was also minimal.").
150. Id. at 338 ("Whatever his other vices, [Bajakajian] does not fit into the class of
persons for whom the statute was principally designed: He is not a money launderer, a
drug trafficker, or a tax evader."). Justice Kennedy raised the possibility that Bajakajian's
"confused stories" about the source of the money and his purpose in transporting it raised
suspicions of his linkage to more serious, but unproven, offenses. Id. at 352 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
151. See id. at 334.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 336.
154. Id. at 334.
155. Id. at 336 (citing as examples Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227, 288 (1983), and
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980)). Significantly, the Court has not cited or
acknowledged Justice Scalia's views on proportionality expressed in Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957 (1991).
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considerations: respect for legislative judgments on crimes and
punishments and the inherent fallibility of judicial determinations
regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense. 156 The standard
of gross disproportionality is ambiguous and devoid of any
determinate bench marks on how much an offense's gravity in a
particular penological context should be proportionate to a particular
fine in order to be within constitutional parameters. But it is clear
that the gross disproportionality standard, at least in theory, is not as
demanding or rigorous as the rejected strict proportionality
standard.'57 Certainly, the review of excessive fines under the gross
disproportionality standard cannot be much different from the
"exceedingly restrictive proportionality review" under its
counterpart, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 5'
Justice- Thomas adopted "gross proportionality" because he
reasonably construed the Excessive Punishments Clause by equating
"excessiveness" with "disproportionality."'159  However, there is
"[n]othing inherent in the ordinary meaning of the term 'excessive'
[that] necessarily requires reference to gross disproportionality."'
Additionally, Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent and in his familiar
style, endorsed the gross disproportionality standard, but disagreed
with its application.161 Justice Kennedy and his three supporting
156. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.
157. Rolland, supra note 141, at 1399 (stating that the gross proportionality standard is
a much lower standard than strict proportionality).
158. Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual. The Autonomous Excessive
Fines Clause and the Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture after United States
v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 465.
159. The Justice derived the meaning of excessiveness from eighteenth and early
nineteenth century dictionaries. 524 U.S. at 335 ("Excessive means surpassing the usual,
the proper, or the normal measure of proportion."). See WEBSTER AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining excessive as beyond the
common measure or proportion); S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGe 680 (4th ed. 1773) ("beyond the common proportion").
160. Barry L. Johnson, 2000 ILL. U. L. REV. at 512 (emphasis added). Professor
Johnson also points out, citing Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, that a
separate prohibition of grossly disproportionate punitive fines is superfluous because the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause already prohibits grossly disproportionate
punishment. Johnson, supra at 512.
161. Justice Kennedy is the original architect of the now prolific proportionality
doctrine. He crafted the doctrine in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), to
cripple the enforcement powers of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Harmelin, he wrote a concurring opinion stating that "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not
require strict proportionality between crimes and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." 501 U.S. 957, 1000
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Justice seems to have the habit of agreeing with
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dissenters charged the majority with unfaithfulness in implementing a
constitutional test that they think is sound and proper.16 ' The
dissenters were upset that the majority "accord[ed] no deference, let
alone substantial deference, to the judgment of Congress.' ' 63 To the
dissenters, this disregard for Congress' assessment of the seriousness
of the crime at issue is "disrespectful of the separation of powers.""
The dissenters' homage to the sanctity of legislative judgments
about crime and respect for the doctrine of separation of powers
amounts to nothing more than meaningless encomium. It should
not have been difficult for them to realize that giving deference to
congressional judgments on crime and punishment undercuts the
utility of the proportionality principle that they ardently promote as a
viable constitutional standard. On the one hand, the proportionality
principle mandates judicial evaluation of congressionally set penalties
that are impugned as excessive. If penalties are immune from judicial
scrutiny, Congress could legislatively eliminate the protections
embodied in the Excessive Fines Clause."6 On the other hand, it is
impossible for the judiciary to accord deference to legislative penal
decisions as contemplated by the gross disproportionality principle.
The decision of the district court in the Bajakajian litigation illustrates
the point. The district court substituted its own judgment for that of
Congress, both as to the seriousness of Bajakajian's crime and the
appropriateness of the penalty that the crime warranted. 67 Finding
moderate positions and then turning around to disagree on some point to achieve his
desired outcome.
162. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 348 ("This test would be a proper way to apply the Clause,
if only the majority were faithful in applying it.") (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
O'Connor & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
163. Id. ("Congress deems the crime serious, but the Court does not."). Id. at 354
("Congress made a considered judgment in setting the penalty, and the Court is in serious
error to set it aside.").
164. Id. at 344.
165. Recall the dissenters respect for congressional judgments on crime and
punishment, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating a federal statute
that made it a crime to possess handguns in a school zone); and United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the violence Against Women Act, which provided a
federal damages remedy to victims of violence motivated by gender bias).
166. Charmin B. Shiely, United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New Standard for Applying
the Excessive Fines Clause to Criminal Forfeitures Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 1595, 1631 (1999) (stating that if a congressionally set "penalty is automatically
viewed as proportional because Congress selected it, then any protection provided by the
Excessive Fines Clause could be legislated out of existence").
167. The district court belittled Bajakajian's crime by attributing his failure to report
the intended transportation of currency to his "distrust for the Government ... stemming
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the statutory forfeiture "extraordinarily harsh," and the maximum
fine set by the Sentencing Guidelines "too little," the court ordered
the forfeiture of an amount that "would 'make up for what I think a
reasonable fine should be."' 1  The Supreme Court's majority
expressed no qualms about the district court's arbitrary forfeiture
amount or its rationale.
If what transpired in Bajakajian represents "substantial
deference" to Congress, then the deference prong of the Court's
proportionality doctrine may mean very little. However, the thought
of paying respect to legislative autonomy in fashioning criminal
legislation is, itself, eminently admirable. It shows that the Court is
indeed sensitive to the structural principle of the separation of
powers. Justice Kennedy and his co-dissenters are right in their
observation that the majority decision in Bajakajian made the
legislative judgment concerning the seriousness of the crime
practically nugatory or irrelevant. The problem with the dissenters'
position is much more serious. In their conception, the
proportionality standard begins and ends with the Justices' threshold
policy judgment as to the seriousness of the crime and the propriety
of the statutorily fixed punishment-a judgment that is likely to favor
even stricter punishment. Considering Justice Kennedy's tendency to
couch harsh outcomes in palatable judicial artifice, the principle of
legislative deference in Bajakajian serves as a convenient smoke
screen.
C. The Due Process Clause
Troubled by the inadequacy of judicial and legislative control at
the State level,"' the Supreme Court has been yearning to rein in
"monstrous ' ' 7 punitive damage awards. But the Court has had
difficulty finding the requisite constitutional footing for federal
intervention. The Court has long conceded that punitive damages
from cultural differences" - referring to his national heritage as a member of the
Armenian minority in Syria. 524 U.S. at 326.
168. Id. (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 63).
169. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("States routinely authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages without
providing them any meaningful instructions on how to do so. Rarely is a jury told any
thing more specific than 'do what you think best."').
170. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
joined by White, J., dissenting) (denouncing the $10 million punitive award in the case as
"526 times actual damages and over 20 times greater than any punitive award in West
Virginia history").
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assessment "has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the
degree of punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on the
peculiar circumstances of each case."' As recently as 1991, the Court
made it clear that "[n]othing in [the Fourteenth] Amendment's text
or history indicates an intention on the part of its drafters to overturn
the [then] prevailing method" of punitive damages assessment,7 1
However, the Court expressed its continuing "concern about punitive
damages that 'run wild.' ' , 173 At last, after much hesitation, the Court
discovered a wide-open constitutional avenue to reach the problem.1
74
Thus, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,75 the Court, for
the first time, "invalidated a state court punitive damage assessment
solely because of its excessive amount.' ' 76 In the case, the purchaser
of a new car sued the seller, a BMW distributor, for not disclosing
that the car was damaged in transit and repainted prior to the sale.
The jury awarded the defrauded buyer $4,000 in compensatory
damages and $4 million in punitive damages17 which was later
reduced to $2 million by the State Supreme Court.'78 The United
States Supreme Court found the punitive damages award against
BMW so "grossly excessive" as to violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'79
The due process constraints on punitive damages awards stem
from the "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence" which dictate fair notice of punishable
171. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363,371 (1851).
172. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17-18 (Blackmun, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White,
Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., writing for the majority.)
173. Id. at 18 ("We note once again our concern about punitive damages that 'run
wild.'").
174. In both Haslip and TXO Production Corp., the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Haslip, the Court found no violation, even though the
punitive damages award of 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, "may be close
to the line" of unconstitutionality. 499 U.S. at 24. In TXO Production Corp., the Court
was "not persuaded" that the punitive damages award of 526 times the actual damages
"was so 'grossly excessive' as to be beyond the power of the State to allow." 509 U.S. at
462.
175. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
176. Glen R. Whitehead, BMW of North America v. Gore: Is the Supreme Court
Initiating Judicial Tort Reform?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 533, 559 (1997).
177. BMW, 517 U.S. at 565.
178. Id. at 567.
179. Id. at 575.
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conduct and the severity of the state-imposed penalty.8' Aided by its
newly erected "[t]hree guideposts"-the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the ratio between the punitive award and the
harm suffered by the plaintiff, and the civil penalties provided in
comparable cases-the Court concluded that BMW was not given fair
notice and, therefore the $2 million punitive damages award was
"grossly excessive."''8' As it did in the two prior cases, the Court
declined to provide any "simple mathematical formula',8 2 or "draw a
bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive
damages award."'' Additionally, the Court made it clear that
restrictions on awards may sometimes constitute an arbitrary
violation of the State's legitimate interest in punishment and
deterrence.'84  Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the ratio
between a punitive damages award and the actual harm to a plaintiff
is the "most commonly cited indicium" of excessiveness. 185 Thus, the
gross excessiveness requirement could be satisfied by proof of "gross
disproportionality." The majority opinion indeed validates Justice
O'Connor's argument in TXO Production Corp. that "the
requirement of proportionality is implicit in the notion of due
process."'86
One mysterious aspect of the majority opinion is that it was
made possible by the support of Justice Kennedy. In TXO
Production Corp., Justice Kennedy rejected the "grossly excessive"
formulation as standardless'87 and insisted that the Constitution "does
180. Id. at 574.
181. Id. at 574-75.
182. Id. at 582.
183. BMW, 517 U.S. at 585. The Court repeated its statement in Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (1991), as it did in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. at 458 (1993), that "[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot, draw
a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit every case." BMW, 517 U.S. at 583.
184. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568. See also id. at 586. (Burger, C.J., joined by O'Connor &
Souter, JJ., concurring) ("We have concluded that this award, in this case, was 'grossly
excessive' in relation to legitimate punitive damages objectives, and hence an arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty, or property in violation of the Due Process Clause.").
185. Id. at 580.
186. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 479.
187. Id. at 466. Justice Kennedy asks the rhetorical question: "excessive in relation to
what?" and then states the answer, "excessive in relation to the conduct of the tort feasor
may be correct, but it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any standard by which to
compare the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it. A reviewing court
employing this formulation comes close to relying upon nothing more than its own
subjective reaction to a particular punitive damages award in deciding whether the award
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not concern itself with dollar amounts, ratios, or the quirks of juries in
specific jurisdictions" but rather with "arbitrary or irrational
deprivations of property." 8  According to the Justice, such
deprivation occurs, regardless of "the absolute or relative size of the
award," "[w]hen a punitive damages award reflects bias, passion, or
prejudice on the part of the jury, rather than rational concern for
deterrence and retribution . ,,18' That sounds like a categorical
repudiation of the very idea of gross proportionality. However,
Justice Kennedy did not give any explanation for his change of heart
in the BMW case.
In her dissent in BMW, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, accused the majority of intruding "into territory
traditionally within the State's domain,"'" embracing a "vague
concept of substantive due process, a 'raised eyebrow' test, as its
ultimate guide...... In an uncommonly bitter dissent in the same case,
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, not only denounced the
majority's reading of the Due Process Clause "as a secret repository
of substantive guarantees against [the] 'unfairness... of an
'unreasonable' punitive award," '192 but also vowed not to be "bound to
give ... stare decisis effect" to the Court's constitutional doctrine
which is "not only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled
application." '193 Justice Scalia characterized the majority decision as
not merely "a judgment about a matter of degree, but a judgment
about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage ....,,194
The majority decision in the BMW case generated more issues
than the dissenters articulated. First, the decision was in obvious
tension with the Seventh Amendment right to have an untarnished
jury decision in a civil litigation.9  Second, the objectives of
violates the Constitution." Id. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
concurred in the opinion because the Court ultimately found the punitive award involved
in TXO constitutional.
188. Id. at 467.
189. Id.
190. 517 U.S. at 612 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 599.
194. Id. at 600.
195. The Seventh Amendment provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tied to a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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reasonableness and proportionality in punitive damages awards are
not always achievable under the rational basis standard that is
customarily used in reviewing economic matters. Finally, as the
dissenters variously argued, the "grossly excessive" or "grossly
disproportionate" formula was so vague that it gave no meaningful
guidance to legislatures and the state and federal courts. The Court
addressed most of these issues in its landmark decision Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 96
Cooper Industries introduced a multi-function pocket tool that
had the basic features of a virtually identical tool designed and
marketed by Leatherman Tool Group.'97 In a suit in federal court
claiming trade-dress infringement, unfair competition and false
advertising under the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946,'9 a jury
awarded Leatherman Tool $50,000 in compensatory and $4.5 million
in punitive damages. 99  Cooper Industries challenged the verdict,
claiming that the punitive damages award was "grossly excessive"
under the BMW of North America v. Gore decision.)° The district
court dismissed Cooper's challenge, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
concluding that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to reduce the amount of punitive damages."' ' The United
States Supreme Court, finding error in the circuit court's use of the
abuse of discretion review standard, vacated the judgment and
remanded. 2
The Court's seven to two opinion, written by Justice Stevens,"3
established several trail-blazing rules for the review of punitive
damages awards. First, it took punitive awards from the pale of the
Seventh Amendment by classifying them as "quasi-criminal"
punishments which constitute no factual determination by the jury
but only expressions of its moral condemnation."l Since "the jury's
award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of 'fact,"'
appellate review of such awards under the Due Process Clause "does
196. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
197. 532 U.S. at 427-28.
198. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 441 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999)).
199. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 429.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 431.
202. Id. at 443.
203. Justice Stevens' majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Breyer.
204. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432.
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not implicate... Seventh Amendment concerns.""2 ' Second, the
Court ruled that the circuit courts should apply a de novo standard of
review when passing on district courts' determinations of the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards2 O The Court's espousal
of the de novo review standard has fueled speculation that "litigants
no longer have a right to have a jury determine the amount of
punitive damages."2 7  Finally, the Court recast the gross
disproportionality principle as an extant and familiar concept that
pervades its criminal law jurisprudence. The Court asserted that its
cases under the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause have
already imposed substantive limits on the States' discretion to mete
out criminal penalties and punitive damages.2" The Court cited five
cases in which violations of the Eighth Amendment or due process
were "predicated on judicial determinations that the punishment[s]
were 'grossly disproportional to the gravity of... defendant[s']
offenses.""'9
In addition to making a single unified principle of gross
disproportionality applicable to all criminal punishments, punitive
forfeitures, and damages across the board, the majority opinion
identified significant markers to help draw the line that would
separate the constitutional from the unconstitutional. These
markers-now designated as "general criteria"-are: "the degree of
the defendant's reprehensibility or culpability, the relationship
between the penalty and the harm to the victim caused by the
defendant's actions, and the sanctions imposed in other cases for
comparable misconduct.""2 '  The three general criteria, which are
remarkably identical to the trio of guideposts specified in the BMW
decision, are culled from the same quintet of cases which the Court
205. Id. at 437.
206. Id. at 436.
207. Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury Assessed
Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 36 U.S.F. L. REV.
411,411 (2002).
208. See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 433.
209. Id. at 434 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), involving excessiveness
of applying death penalty to a person who did not take or attempted to take life; Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), stating death sentence is "grossly disproportionate" and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), holding
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for non-violent felonies to be "significantly
disproportionate"; United States v. Bajakajian, 524 US. 321 (1998), finding punitive
forfeiture for reporting violation to was "grossly disproportional"; and BMW of N. Am. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), finding punitive damage award "grossly excessive").
210. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 435.
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identified as the wellspring of the gross proportionality standard."
The Court emphasized the need for "independent examination of the
relevant criteria" by the judiciary because gross proportionality is as
"fluid" or imprecise a concept as "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause."2 '2
Justice Ginsburg was not impressed with the majority's earnest
effort to synthesize divergent cases, that were decided under
disparate constitutional provisions, in order to formulate a uniform
standard for criminal punishment, punitive forfeitures, and damages.
Even Justices Scalia and Thomas, who saw no constitutional
constraint against excessive punitive damages, wrote single paragraph
concurrences agreeing with the Court that the trial court decision
should be reviewed de novo by the appellate court.213 In her solitary
dissent, Justice Ginsburg maintained that the standard of review for
punitive awards should not be de novo, but only "abuse of
discretion."2 '4 Disagreeing with the majority's view that jury verdicts
on punitive damages are not fact-dependent, Justice Ginsburg
asserted that punitive damages are "not 'unlike the measure of actual
damages suffered' in cases of intangible, noneconomic injury2 '5 and
are therefore, "fundamentally dependent" on fact finding."6 In her
view "[o]ne million dollars' worth of pain and suffering does not exist
as a 'fact' in the world any more or less than one million dollars'
worth of moral outrage."2 '7 Clearly, Justice Ginsburg, with Justices
Scalia and Thomas, is dead against any constitutional control of
punitive damages awards."8
211. See id. After stating each of the criteria, the Court cited the same five cases:
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (1983);
Enmund; 458 U.S. 782 (1982); and Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
212. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 435-36.
213. Id. at 443 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that the Constitution
does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards"); Id. at 443-44 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("I was (and remain) of the view that excessive punitive
damages do not violate Due Process Clause.").
214. Id. at 444 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 446.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 444-50. Justice Ginsburg objected to gross disproportionality review
because of the use of the de novo review standard. Id. The Justice's opposition to gross
disproportionatility review was based on her hesitation to intrude "into an area
dominantly of state concern." Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It is
reasonable to conclude that Justice Ginsburg not only is against constitutional control of
punitive damages, but against the idea of gross disproportionality review as well.
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IV. JUDICIAL APATHY TOWARD THE DISABLED
In the context of review of congressional legislation to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause, the congruence and proportionality test
has functioned as a doctrinal twin to the Court's established standards
of constitutional scrutiny. The test and the standards work in tandem
to completely insulate state governments from the reach of federal
anti-discrimination laws. The congruence and proportionality test has
been decisive in safeguarding discriminatory state practices that stood
no chance of surviving even the lowest rationality standard of review.
Thus, with the Court's current majority ideologically committed to
protect "state sovereignty" from federal intrusion at any cost, the
congruence and proportionality test operates as an indispensable
fourth standard of constitutional scrutiny that could appropriately be
called "the standard of no rationality." This is exactly how the test
appeared to work in the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in University of Alabama
v. Garrett.
219
The ADA prohibits employers, including the States, from
"discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such an individual, 221 in matters of employment
and requires employers to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
[the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer's]
business., 2 1 In Garrett, the Court held that victims of employment
discrimination are barred from suing their state employers for money
damages as authorized by the ADA because the ADA does not
constitute "appropriate" enforcement legislation that validly
abrogates the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States under the
Eleventh Amendment.222 According to the prevailing interpretation
219. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Tit.
I(Employment) [42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2003)]).
220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
222. Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 363 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XI, which provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." ) The Court has extended
the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. See Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Court also has construed Eleventh
Amendment immunity as barring congressionally authorized suits against non-consenting
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, enforcement legislation is not
considered "appropriate" '223 unless it is "corrective in its character
[and] adapted to counteract and redress the operation" of state laws
or policies that run counter to the rights guaranteed by the
Amendment.22 ' Only legislation that is designed to remedy or redress
state transgressions qualifies as "appropriate."2 5 Therefore, in order
to condemn the ADA as inappropriate enforcement legislation, the
Court had to conclude that the state employers were not
unconstitutionally discriminating against disabled individuals..
A. Rationality Review
As the first step to reaching the conclusion that states are not
discriminating against the disabled, the Court downgraded disability
discrimination to a constitutional status that deserves no more than
the lowest standard of review. The Court simply claimed that a state
classification based on disability "cannot run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the
disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose" '226
and that the states can deny special accommodations to the disabled,
and do so "quite hardheartedly and perhaps hardheadedly" so long as
their actions toward such individuals are rational.27 The Court's
claim is entirely based on its 1985 decision in Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc. that held that a classification based on mental
retardation was not "quasi-suspect. ,22
8
The Cleburne Court offered no textual or historical support for
relegating disability discrimination to the rationality standard of
review. Nevertheless, it found the discrimination at issue in the case
was irrational and unconstitutional. Therefore, the Cleburne Court's
discussion of the standard of review is at best tangential to its
decision.229 Moreover, in Garrett, the Court should not have given
States in State courts. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
223. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress to "enforce" the rights
guaranteed by the Amendment by "appropriate" legislation).
224. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,18 (1883); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 520-25 (1997).
225. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525.
226. Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 367.
227. Id. at 367-68.
228. Id. at 357 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435).
229. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-50 (The Cleburne Court was prodded to discuss the
review standard by the holding of the lower court that disability classification was "quasi-
suspect.").
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such decisive weight to the Cleburne decision - which, after all,
involved only a city ordinance that required a special use permit for
the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. It is easy to
presume that the Cleburne Court would have ruled differently had it
been considering the constitutionality of the ADA - national
legislation of enormous scope and vital significance to millions of
disabled individuals. Even if the Cleburne decision is an accurate
depiction of the law of disability discrimination a decade and a half
ago, there can still be questions concerning the continuing vitality of
the decision's underlying reasoning and its applicability to national
disability legislation. However, the Garrett Court largely ignored the
reasoning of the Cleburne decision.
As the four dissenting Justices in Garrett pointed out, the
Cleburne Court's decision not to subject disability discrimination to
heightened scrutiny reflected its reluctance "to closely scrutinize
legislative choices" due to "respect for the separation of powers." 230
Recognizing the inherent difficulty in deciding how to treat the "large
diversified group" of disabled people, the Cleburne Court decided
that it should be "very much a task for legislators guided by qualified
professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the
judiciary." '231 Additionally, the Cleburne Court noted the three
existing federal statutes that were designed to provide assistance to
the disabled,232 and expressed satisfaction over the commitment of
federal and state governments to assist the disabled.233
The ADA represents the fulfillment of the need identified in
Cleburne-a comprehensive legislative determination of how to treat
the disabled. Congress spent years on studies, hearings, and reporting
to identify the multiple dimensions of the problem of prejudice and
discrimination that the disabled encounter in every walk of life,
including employment. The ADA embodies the carefully crafted
legislative solution to that national problem. The Garrett Court did
not identify the constitutional footing for the rationality standard nor
did it give any sound justification for using that standard to override
the groundbreaking national antidiscrimination legislation.
230. 531 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441).
231. 473 U.S. at 443.
232. Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
6060(1), (2) (2002); Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (2002);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002).
233. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443-44.
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The Court has not yet offered any doctrinally consistent
justification for the application of rationality review to state
discriminatory practices that defy federal prohibition. Consider the
Court's justification for holding, in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,234 that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA)235 does not validly abrogate the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity and, therefore, that the states are not bound
by the ADEA's prohibitions. The essential predicate for the holding
was the Court's conclusion that a "State may discriminate on the basis
of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age
classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.236  The Court gave two key reasons for reviewing age
discrimination under the rationality standard. First, "age is not a
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause" because
older people are not a discrete and insular minority and they have not
been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment.237
Second, "[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may rely on age
as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are
relevant to the state's legitimate interests. That age proves to be an
inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. 23 8 If these
reasons are sound and objective, they were not repeated or relied on
by the Court to support its determination to review disability
discrimination under the rationality standard. Instead, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion tries to insinuate that no more
justification for rationality review is needed than what is contained in
the elusive Cleburne decision.
Nevertheless, the Kimel justifications are absurd in the context of
disability discrimination. Congress has already designated the
disabled a discrete and insular minority "subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment and relegated to a position of
[powerlessness] in our society." '239 As Cleburne contemplated, our
national legislature is the appropriate and competent body to make
such a designation. More importantly, the States cannot rely on
disability "as a proxy for other qualities, abilities or characteristics
that are relevant to the State's legitimate interests." One of the
234. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
235. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III); 81 Stat. 602, as amended.
236. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 84.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995).
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fundamental objectives of the ADA is to prohibit employers from
judging the disabled on the basis of "stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society.
' 210
B. Congruence and Proportionality
By removing most of the blemishes of unconstitutionality from
State discriminatory practices, the Court has created the necessary
condition for the application of the "congruence and proportionality"
test. Without the test, the States would have remained vulnerable to
liability for "irrational discrimination" against the disabled, such as
occurred in the Cleburne case. The only way to shield the States from
exposure to liability for damages was to find that the ADA failed the
congruence and proportionality test.
The test requires more than proof of irrational discrimination. In
order for enforcement legislation to survive the test, the Court
insisted, "there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States
which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed
by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted
violation."241 The Court offered no objective yardstick or guideline to
measure incongruity or disproportionality. Justice Breyer and his
three co-dissenters were satisfied that Congress had "compiled a vast
legislative record documenting 'massive, society-wide discrimination'
against the disabled., 242 They specifically culled from the legislative
record "roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments
themselves."2 '3 However, the Court's majority found the evidence
faulty and inadequate. The majority opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist discards most evidence cited by the dissent as indicative of
discrimination by local governments or by society in general. He
recognized only "half a dozen examples from the record that did
involve States. 2 4 The Chief Justice concluded that "[t]he legislative
240. Id. The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals who are actually
disabled, and also against those who have a history of disability or who are simply
regarded as disabled.
241. Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 374.
242. Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 8-9 (1989)).
243. Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 379.
244. Id. at 369. The court already is set to decide if Congress identified a pattern of
irrational state discrimination against the disabled in access to public accommodations
sufficient to validate enforcement of Title II of the ADA against the states. Med. Bd. of
Cal. v. Hason, 123 S.Ct. 561 (2002), case below 279 F. 3d 1167 (2002).
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record of the ADA, however, simply failed to show that Congress did
in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in
employment against the disabled."2 '5
Even if Congress had demonstrated a pattern of unconstitutional
state discrimination, the ADA requirement of "reasonable
accommodation" for the disabled would still fail the congruence and
proportionality test. The ADA exempts employers from the
accommodation duty if they "can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the[ir] business." '246 Nevertheless, the Court found that "even with this
exception the accommodation duty far exceeds what is
constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of
alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of
imposing an 'undue burden' upon the employer." '247
Without the congruence and proportionality test, the States
would remain liable for discriminatory employment practices that are
not shielded by the standard of rationality review. In such a case,
requiring reasonable accommodation that causes no undue burden on
the employer would be a viable remedial response to unconstitutional
discrimination. In fact, accommodation requirements and
antidiscrimination laws are constitutional equivalents; in some cases
they are inseparable.248
The requirement that Congress should identify a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination and then establish this pattern with
evidence satisfactory to the Court is patently inconsistent with the
Court's past interpretation of Congress' enforcement powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 By imposing such a seemingly
impossible burden on Congress, the Court, as the dissenting Justices
stated, is simply treating Congress as an administrative agency or a
245. Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 368.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
247. 531 U.S. at 372.
248. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,
651 (2001) ("This argument is normative in any sense; it is simply that there is no way, as a
factual matter, to distinguish the specified aspects of antidiscrimination law [in particular
its disparate impact branch] from [the] requirement of accommodation.").
249. The Court has stated in the past that "the Fourteenth Amendment... [ is a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), and that
"Congress may use any rational means" to prevent the States from discriminating. South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966). The Court never overruled these
precedents, but rather frequently pays lip service to them.
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lower court."' Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion supports the
dissenters' accusation. Weighing in against the disabled in his
customary style,25' Justice Kennedy claimed that the lack of
"confirming judicial documentation" from litigation by the disabled in
state and federal courts was evidence of the absence of State
constitutional transgressions.252
According to the Court's own characterization, state disability
laws are in the category of "general social and economic legislation"
deserving review under the rational basis standard.253 The ADA
belongs to the same category and, therefore, it also merits rationality
review. However, the Court subjected the ADA to a stricter standard
of review. The Garrett Court requires Congress to prune
antidiscrimination legislation in a manner reminiscent of the narrow
tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. Congressional findings
relating to the persistence of societal discrimination are not relevant
to the question of discrimination by a State under Garrett." The
Court even discounted the probative value of evidence of
discrimination collected by a congressionally appointed Task Force.255
Further, the Court limited the ADA exclusively to "irrational state
discrimination," thereby excluding the bulk of covert and overt
discriminatory behavior against the disabled.256 It was suggested that
the "shortcomings" of the ADA would be lessened if its application
were strictly limited to identified discriminating States and then only
after determining that "litigation had proved ineffective" to tame
them. 7  Congress is admonished in unequivocal terms not to
250. Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 376.
251. Justice Kennedy, before voting for the majority, made the platitudinal statement:
"There can be little doubt, then, that persons with mental or physical impairments are
confronted with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as well as from
malicious ill will." Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 375-376.
253. Id. at 366.
254. See id. at 371.
255. See id. at 370.
256. Id. at 368 ("The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that
Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination against the
disabled").
257. Congress is advised to do what it did in fashioning the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
The Court recounted the factors that it considered in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966), which approved the Act. In addition to geographical limitation, in
enacting the Voting Rights Act "Congress also determined that litigation [which provided
remedies for proven violations of the Equal Protection Clause] had proved ineffective."
Univ. of Alab., 531 U.S. at 373.
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prescribe a remedy that "exceeds what is constitutionally required."2 8
All of these requirements, imposed on Congress under the aegis of
the congruence and proportionality test,"' partake of the nature of
narrow tailoring. Garrett and the two other antidiscrimination cases
that preceded it26 lead to only one conclusion: that the congruence
and proportionality test is an unstructured and open-ended form of
strict scrutiny.26 The Court's approach to antidiscrimination
legislation mystified the four dissenting Justices who expressed
"difficult[y] [in] understanding why the Court, which applies
'minimum "rational basis" review' to statutes that burden persons
with disabilities ... subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks
to help those same individuals.
262
C. Suggested Alternatives
As if trying to cushion the heavy impact of its harsh decision on
258. Id. at 372.
259. Id. at 374. To authorize a private damages remedy "there must be a pattern of
discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy
imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation."
260. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529,
U.S. 598 (2000).
261. See Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 511 (2000)
("Both Morrison and Kimel have displayed the tendency to allow the [City of Boerne v.
Flores's congruence and proportionality] test to slide into a kind of narrow tailoring, as if
even Section 5 legislation enacted for a proper purpose must nevertheless be shown to be
a 'carefully delimited' remediation of an appropriate constitutional violation."). See also
id. at 477 ("Yet Morrison uses the congruence and proportionality test to fasten tight
restrictions on the exercise of otherwise legitimate Section 5 legislation, restrictions that
seem analogous to the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny.").
For a similar understanding of the scope of the congruence and proportionality test, see
Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 165 (1997) ("The 'congruence and proportionality'
standard appears to be more rigorous than the standard of review applied in earlier
section five cases, such as Katzenbach v. Morgan ... in effect, the Boerne Court replaced
something akin to 'rational basis scrutiny' with a narrow tailoring requirement typical of
intermediate scrutiny"); Thomas W. Beimers, Searching for the Structural Vision of City of
Boerne v. Flores: Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the New Constitutional Architecture,
26 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 789, 802 (1999) ("In essence, congruence requires a tight fit
between the wrong to be prevented and the means to be adopted...").
In fact, the Court acknowledged that the congruence and proportionality test demands
narrow tailoring when it restated the Boerne test in Florida Prepaid. 527 U.S. 627, 639
(1999) ("We thus held that for Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.").




the disabled of this nation, the Garrett Court offered some soothing
alternatives. In the final footnote to his opinion, the Chief Justice
reminds disabled persons that, in spite of the Court's decision, they
still have "federal recourse against [state] discrimination, 263 in the
form of suits for damages by the United States against state violators
of ADA standards and private individual suits for injunctive relief
under Ex parte Young.26 But these alternatives "are inadequate to
protect the rights of state employees. 2 65 Consider the plight of the
plaintiff in Garrett. The University of Alabama Hospital demoted
Patricia Garrett, its Director of Nursing, on her return from treatment
for breast cancer and then forced her to take a lower paying
position.26 Although Garrett is a victim of discrimination and is
entitled to recover money damages under the ADA, she is barred
from enforcing her federal rights in federal courts. She is also barred
from suing in state courts by state-law doctrines of sovereign
immunity.267 Therefore, in the end "[s]he has a legal right, but she has
no legal right., 268 Because of the built-in limitations stemming from
policy and budgetary considerations, federal enforcement action
seeking money damages from the State of Alabama can only be a rare
occurrence.269 Even if an Ex parte Young action is feasible,270 it would
263. Id. at 374 n.9 ("Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the
States.").
264. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123,166 (1908).
265. Brent W. Landau, State Employees and Sovereign Immunity: Alternatives and
Strategies for Enforcing Federal Employment Laws, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 170
(2002).
266. Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. at 362.
267. Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution provides that "the State of
Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." The Alabama
Supreme Court held that "Section 14 prohibits the State from being made a defendant in
any court of this state and neither the State nor any individual can consent to a suit against
the State." Williams v. Hank's Ambulance Serv., 699 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Ala. 1997)
(quoting Gunter v. Beasley, 414 So.2d 41, 48 (Ala. 1982)). For a good description of the
absolute nature of the state sovereign immunity, see Evelyn Corwin McCafferty, Age
Discrimination and Sovereign Immunity: Does Kimel signal the End of the Line for
Alabama's State Employees?, 52 ALA. L. REV; 1057 (2001).
268. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Discrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L. J. 1141, 1149
(2002).
269. Apart from the constraints of scarce employee resources, the federal government
would be hesitant to take up the interests of a few discriminated against state employees
to seek money damages from a "sovereign" State and run the political risk of alienating
voters and state politicians.
270. Ex parte Young doctrine has a checkered history. Even though the doctrine has
been reaffirmed recently in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997),
the Court restricted its scope by holding that "where Congress has prescribed a detailed
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not provide an aggrieved state employee any monetary relief.
71
Therefore, federal enforcement and private injunctive actions are not
viable substitutes for private suits for damages under the ADA.
But the Garrett footnote also referred to state disability laws as
alternative "independent avenues of redress., 212 An objective analysis
of the State disability statutes shows that they are either inadequate
or ineffective substitutes for the right to sue for damages that is
granted by the ADA to state employees. The disability statutes of
thirty-eight States do not provide a damages remedy beyond an
award of back pay to discriminated state employees in civil actions. 3
Rights to sue for what relief is available are hedged with substantive
and procedural restrictions by the disability statutes of forty-eight
States.27' Therefore, while the fact that all of the States have enacted
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a state of a statutorily created right, a court
should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a
state officer based upon Ex parte Young." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
74 (1996). Also, a suit against a state official under the Young doctrine is barred when
"the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 10l(1984). The Chief Justice is not unaware of these restrictions
because he was part of the Court's majority decisions in both Seminole Tribe and
Pennhurst.
271. The Ex parte Young suits allow only injunctive relief to prevent continuing
violations of federal law by state officials. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 166.
272. 531 U.S. at 374 n.9, citing id. at 368 n.5 ("It is worth noting that by the time that
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted [disability
statutes].").
273. Only twelve states, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington, have statutes
explicitly allowing for damages in civil rights actions. Courts have found implied authority
to award damages in such actions in an additional five states, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, and West Virginia. Annotation, Recovery of Damages as Remedy for Wrongful
Discrimination Under State or Local Civil Rights Provisions, 85 A.L.R.3d 351, §§ 3-4,
(1978 & Supp. 2000).
274. Only Tennessee and Vermont allow state employees to sue for disability
discrimination in state court without restriction. Twelve more states allow, with minimal
restrictions, state employees to privately bring civil actions for disability discrimination in
state courts with a right to a jury trial: Alaska, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia.
Another five states allow such actions with minimal restrictions, but do not provide for
jury trials: Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, and Texas. Charles R.
Richey, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS, APP A-3, (1994 & rev. 2001). Of the remaining states, eight do
not allow state employees to file private lawsuits for disability discrimination: Alabama,
Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Brent W.
Landau, State Employees and Sovereign Immunity: Alternatives and Strategies for
Enforcing Federal Employment Laws, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 190 n.193 (2002). The
remaining 23 states require state employees to bring their disability discrimination claims
before an administrative hearing with limited rights of appeal to the state courts. Richey,
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disability laws is extremely significant, it is inappropriate to overstate
their role as available substitutes for the ADA.
Instead of giving false hope to the disabled, the Court easily
could have found a silver lining in the legislative judgments of the
States concerning the disabled. Each of the state disability statutes,
regardless of its scope, represents an expression of public sentiment
against discriminatory treatment of disabled citizens.275 Four of the
Court's conservative Justices have long maintained that "[t]he
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values
is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." '276 In the
context of assessing the constitutionality of the death sentence, the
Court readily found a "broad societal consensus" '277 in favor of the
death penalty in state legislatures' judgment as manifested in
"roughly 20 states.""27 And most recently, when six Justices of the
Court ruled against the execution of mentally retarded persons,
they relied on "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society"''  as drawn from eighteen state
statutes banning such executions. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas thought that "agreement among forty-
seven percent of the death penalty jurisdictions" did not amount to a
"national consensus."28' But even these Justices should have no
difficulty in discerning from all the state antidiscrimination statutes a
supra APP A-3.
275. If a particular state disability law, such as the law of Alabama, fails to provide full
protections to the disabled against employment discrimination, it reflects the State's long
standing attitude toward discrimination not only against the disabled, but against its
minority population in general. What is significant is that even Alabama has a disability
law. Ala. Code § 21-7-1 (1975). One of the major objectives of the ADA is to provide a
federal remedy to make up for the deficiencies that exist in various state disability laws.
See supra, notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
276. Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, & White, JJ.)
277. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 147 (1987) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 788 (1982) (holding that the death penalty was proportional to the crime of robbery-
felony murder)). The Court's opinion in Tison was written by Justice O'Connor, and
joined, among others, by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
278. Tison, 481 U.S. at 178 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
279. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002). (Stevens, J., joined
by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ).
280. Id. at 2261 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia accused the majority of engaging
in a "feeble effort to fabricate a 'national consensus."' Id. at 2264. The Chief Justice
blamed the majority for interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to bar
execution of the retarded, based on eighteen state laws, despite the fact that twenty other
states continue to adhere to the death penalty. Id. at 2252 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 2261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Summer 20021
standard of decency and a national consensus against mistreatment of
the disabled in all walks of life, including public employment. The
ADA, enacted with near unanimity in both chambers of our national
legislature and signed by a conservative president, is certainly the
embodiment of the prevailing national consensus. Five Justices of the
Supreme Court have lost sight of that stark reality.
D. The Extra-Constitutional Factor
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Garrett raises more
constitutional and moral questions than it resolves. It substantially
undermines the enforcement power of Congress by declaring state
discrimination against the disabled presumptively valid and requires
Congress to prove that its legislation banning even the most egregious
and irrational state discrimination is tailored to meet the test of
"congruence and proportionality." '282 The Garrett decision abruptly
impeded, if not reversed, progress toward the integration of
competent and qualified disabled individuals into the mainstream
workforce of the nation. Therefore, the decision is morally
inexplicable except on sound constitutional principles.
The Garrett decision has severe constitutional flaws. To begin
with, review of state discrimination against the disabled under the
minimum rationality standard has no constitutional mooring. As fully
articulated in the next segment of this article, the arbitrariness of such
low level review is highlighted by the Court's use of strict scrutiny
review against interstate commercial discrimination - even at the
expense of the core aspects of state sovereignty. Moreover, the Court
downgrades disability discrimination on the scale of constitutional
values protected by the Equal Protection Clause. By doing so, the
Court defies the declaration of Thaddeus Stevens-the chief architect
of the Clause, who was himself a victim of disability discrimination-
that under the Clause "no distinction would be tolerated in this
purified Republic but what arose from merit and conduct." '83 It is
indeed "a cruel irony [that] the clause [Thaddeus Stevens] loved was
interpreted so that the very discrimination that motivated it would
continue to be tolerated."284  To make matters even worse, as
282. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
283. MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR
AT THE BAR REBEL ON THE BENCH 27 (rev. ed. 1994).
284. Aaron J. Walker, "No Distinction Would be Tolerated": Thaddeus Stevens,
Disability, and the Original Intent of the Equal Protection Clause, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 265, 301 (2000).
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explained in detail later, the brand new "congruence and
proportionality" test is an unbridled judicial construct that has no
basis in the text or history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
V. THE INVERTED DOCTRINE OF STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
The Supreme Court's willingness to tolerate state discrimination
against the disabled to safeguard state sovereignty calls for
comparison with its absolute intolerance of state discrimination
against corporate and business interests without showing any
discernible concern for state sovereignty. In effect, under the self-
assumed oversight authority created by its Dormant (negative)
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court has fashioned a theory of
commercial discrimination that cuts into the core of the state
sovereignty.
An analytical comparison between the theories of discrimination
developed under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause is appropriate and enlightening in several respects.
First, there are striking similarities between the two constitutional
provisions. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment has twin aspects-a
grant of legislative power to Congress and a limitation on state
sovereignty-the Commerce Clause "has long been seen as a
limitation on state regulatory powers, as well as an affirmative grant
of congressional authority." '285 In its negative aspect, "the Commerce
Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a
limitation upon the power of States." '286
Second, the Court's lopsided antidiscrimination rules under the
two constitutional provisions demonstrate that it is disposed to
disregard the interests of state sovereignty to protect commercial
values, and not to protect the human values enshrined in civil rights
statutes such as the ADA.
Third, the antidiscrimination rules of the Dormant Commerce
Clause clearly undercut the Court's assertion that the proportionality
standard of the Fourteenth Amendment is indispensable to prevent
congressional antidiscrimination laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment from intruding into the states' legislative domain. In
enforcing its strict rules against state commercial discrimination as the
285. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996).
286. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 571 (1997) (citing
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373 (1945); Freeman v. Hearst, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
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surrogate of Congress under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the
Court never considered it necessary to restrain itself from
overstepping its authority by means of a proportionality standard. If
a proportionality standard is appropriate for gauging the limits of
federal authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, it should be
equally appropriate to use it as a gauge of the limits of the Dormant
Commerce Clause authority to achieve the same enforcement goal.
Under such a parallel proportionality standard, the Court may
arguably be better able to determine whether the state interest
advanced in support of commercial discrimination in any given case is
disproportionate to the national interest in protecting interstate
commerce. However, the Court recently asserted, without offering
any persuasive reasoning, that the proportionality standard is
applicable only to Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation,
and not suitable for review of legislation enacted pursuant to Article I
authorization.287
287. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), the Court declined to apply the
"congruence and proportionality" standard to determine whether the 1998 Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA) exceeded Congress' power under the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. The Court simply stated that it had
"never applied that standard outside the § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] context; it
does not hold sway for judicial review of legislation enacted, as copyright laws are,
pursuant to Article I authorization." Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 788. The Court added that
Congress has only the power to "enforce" under § 5, but it possessed the power to "define
the scope of the substantive right" under the Copyright Clause and that congressional
definition deserves judicial deference. Id. This is hardly a persuasive justification for not
applying the proportionality standard to copyright laws. First, the Court has always
accorded "judicial deference" to Congress' determination as to what is enforceable under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the distinction between "enforce" and "define" has
no bearing on the plaintiff's argument in the case that the congruence and proportionality
standard is appropriate to determine whether Congress has transgressed its power to
define the scope of the Copyright Clause in enacting CTEA. Whether the standard is used
to review enforcement legislation or defining legislation, the focus of the review is the
same: whether Congress has exceeded its constitutionally assigned powers.
At any rate, enforcement-definition dichotomy is not entirely pertinent to review under
the Dormant Commerce Clause for two specific reasons. First, review under Dormant
Commerce Clause entails no congressional legislation. What is involved in such review is
judicial "enforcement" of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. Second, the
Rehnquist conservative majority of the Court has insisted since 1995 that Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause is "limited" and that it will be "interpreted as
having judicially enforceable outer limits." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610
(2001); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). One can only wonder
what the Court's justification for not applying the proportionality standard in Eldred really
is. The answer may be implicit in the Court's curt statement: "It would be no more
appropriate for us to subject the CTEA to 'congruence and proportionality' review under
the Copyright Clause than it would be for us to hold the Act unconstitutional per se."
Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 788. The Court here seems to admit that review under the
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A. Discriminatory State Taxes
Negative commerce clause jurisprudence is a composite of
intricate and far-reaching restrictions on the States' power to regulate
their own economic and commercial affairs. In general, state laws
that evince simple economic protectionism or impose an undue
burden on interstate commerce are subject to judicial scrutiny of
varying intensity and possible invalidation under the Dormant
Commerce Clause."8 The jurisprudence comes down hardest on the
States' authority to formulate tax policies that the States deem
appropriate for the welfare of their citizens. The Court's unanimous
decision in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner289 fully articulates the Dormant
Commerce Clause restrictions on the States' taxing power.
In Fulton, the Court invalidated a North Carolina "intangibles
tax" on corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents. The tax
was assessed at a rate of one quarter of one percent of the fair market
value of the stock held; but the taxpayer was allowed to take a
deduction equal to the percentage of the issuing corporation's income
taxed in North Carolina. For example, if a corporation's entire
income was taxed in North Carolina, a taxpayer would get a
corresponding 100% deduction from the intangibles tax. Thus, the
tax deduction was tied to the extent of the issuing corporation's
business in North Carolina. The Court found the intangibles tax
facially discriminatory because a scheme "that taxes stock only to the
degree that its issuing corporation participates in interstate commerce
favors domestic corporations over their foreign competitors in raising
capital among North Carolina residents and tends, at least, to
discourage domestic corporations from plying their trades in
interstate commerce.
290
Under the established rules of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
the North Carolina intangibles tax was destined for automatic
condemnation.21  These rules are reasonably clear as to what
proportionality standard is truly lethal to any congressional legislation.
288. Economic protectionism is discrimination against other states engaged in
interstate commerce, and therefore, it is a per se violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). A state law which imposes
undue burden on interstate commerce will be subject to a balancing test to determine
whether a legitimate state purpose that would outweigh the burden on interstate
commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
289. 516 U.S. 325 (1996). (Souter, J.) Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a single paragraph
concurring opinion. Id. at 348.
290. Id. at 333.
291. North Carolina conceded that its intangibles tax was facially discriminatory. Id.
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constitutes discrimination and what defenses are available, which are
not many. "[D]iscrimination simply means differential treatment of
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former
and burdens the latter., 292 In Fulton, the Court further defined the
meaning of discrimination in the context of state taxation by vowing
that it would treat a state law as discriminatory if it "'tax[es] a
transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than
when it occurs entirely within the State.' 293  Though it is clear that
"[d]isparate treatment constitutes discrimination only if the objects of
the disparate treatment are, for the relevant purposes, similarly
situated,, 291 the question as to whether the objects are identically
situated can be so murky as to necessitate an extensive fact-specific
inquiry.9
The standards of review applied to the state laws that interfere
with interstate commerce have become relatively constant.
Discriminatory state law restrictions on interstate commerce are
"virtually per se invalid, 296 and subject to the "strictest scrutiny., 297
That admission called for strict scrutiny of the intangibles tax scheme.
292. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); see
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6. (1992).
293. 516 U.S. at 331. The statement was attributed to Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638, 642 (1984), and repeated in Chemical Waste Mgmt, 504 U.S. at 342.
294. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 601 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 583 n.16 (Stevens, J.).
295. This question was the focus of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in the Camps
Newfound case, which involved the constitutionality of a Maine property tax exemption
statute. The law gave a tax exemption to charitable institutions which served mostly state
residents and withheld the same exemption from charitable institutions which served out-
of-state customers. The Court found the statute facially discriminatory because "it
disparately treats identically situated Maine non-profit camps depending on whether they
favor in-state, as opposed to out-of-state campers." Id. at 583 n.16. The Court further
explained: "Ninety-five percent of petitioner's campers come from out of state. Insofar as
Maine's discriminatory tax has increased tuition, that burden is felt almost entirely by out-
of-staters, deterring them from enjoying the benefits of camping in Maine. In sum, the
Maine statute facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and is all but per se
invalid." Id. at 581.
In contrast, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and
Ginsburg, wrote a vigorous dissent. Justice Scalia, claiming that the tax exemption's
serving the town's interest in relieving its social service burden validated the statute,
asserted that because the resident-benefiting charities were not 'similarly situated' to the
non-resident benefiting charities, the statute was not discriminatory. Id. at 603 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
296. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99. The Court applies the same rule to a law
discriminatory "on its face." See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 344; Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at
581.
297. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337
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But "nondiscriminatory [state] regulations that have only incidental
effects on interstate commerce are valid unless 'the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. '' 298  To save a law under the strictest scrutiny test, the
discriminating state has to demonstrate that the law "'advances a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. ' ' 2" The state's burden
under strictest scrutiny is "extremely difficult" to discharge, and for
that reason the Court cautioned that "'facial discrimination by itself
may be a fatal defect."' 3
Strictest scrutiny, as applied to discriminatory tax laws, is equally
harsh if not harsher. In 1992, the Court bluntly declared that "[o]nce
a state tax is found to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, it is
typically struck down without further inquiry.""3 1 However, in later
cases, the Court seemed to relent when it recognized that a facially
discriminating tax may have a chance to survive "strictest scrutiny" if
it is shown to be "a valid 'compensatory tax' designed simply to make
interstate commerce bear a burden already borne by intrastate
commerce.""3 2 Nevertheless, the Court's compensatory tax doctrine is
so front-loaded with insurmountable conditions that showing a
discriminatory tax to be truly a compensatory tax is almost
impossible. The tax claimed to be compensatory has to meet three
requirements: the State must identify the intrastate tax burden that it
is attempting to compensate; the tax on interstate commerce must be
roughly equal to or below the amount of the tax on intrastate
commerce; and the interstate and intrastate taxes must be imposed on
"substantially equivalent" events."' The Court itself doubted that the
tripartite showing required by its compensatory tax doctrine "[could]
ever be made outside the limited confines of sales and use taxes.
3 °4
The commerce clause review formula is sui generis and it bears
no resemblance to the rationality standard that the Court customarily
(1979)); see also Fulton, 516 U.S. at 333.
298. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970)).
299. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581 (citing Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101 [quoting
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988)]).
300. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 582 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101).
301. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992); see also Camps
Newfound, 520 U.S. at 582.
302. Assoc. Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994), accord, Fulton, 516 U.S. at 331.
303. Fulton, 516 U.S. at 332-333.
304. Id. at 334.
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uses to review economic and social legislation. The formula, sui
generis, flourishes in a carefully built fortress, increasingly insulated
from conflicting anti-discrimination precedents and principles of
review such as those developed under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court has been making a gradual but sustained effort to free the
issues of commercial discrimination from the grips of established
equal protection principles. As a unanimous Court declared a
quarter century ago, "it has long been settled that a [tax]
classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor violative of
the Equal Protection Clause ... if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it."3 5  In Fulton, the State tried to
demonstrate that the Court "settled" the equal protection issue
almost a century ago. It cited Kidd v. Alabama3 6 and Darnell v.
Indiana3 °7 in support of its tax law. But the Court came up with a
cryptic response:
To the extent that Darnell evaluated a discriminatory state tax
under the Equal Protection Clause, time simply has passed it.
While we continue to measure the equal protection of economic
legislation by a "rational basis" test ... , we now understand
the [D]ormant Commerce Clause to require justifications for
discriminatory restrictions on commerce [to] pass the "strictest
scrutiny" .... Hence, while cases like Kidd and Darnell may
still be authorities under the Equal Protection Clause, they are
no longer good law under the Commerce Clause.0 8
It is hardly a convincing rationale to reject settled precedents rooted
in the only provision of the Constitution that embodies "the idea of
constitutionally protected equality"3' by offering a substitute rooted
in the "incoherent" Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that,
according to some critics, "has been an open scandal for
305. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959). The case involved a challenge
to an Ohio ad valorem tax charged against an Ohio resident based on the average value of
merchandise held in Ohio warehouses for storage only, while the law exempted identical
property of non-Ohio corporations. This merchandise was presumed to have been in
interstate transit.
306. 188 U.S. 730 (1903). In Kidd, the Court sustained a tax classification emphasizing
that the equal protection clause allowed "large latitude ... to the States for
classification[s] upon any reasonable basis." Id. at 733.
307. 226 U.S. 390 (1912). In Darnell, the State taxed the property of domestic
corporations and the stock of foreign corporations in similar cases. Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes found the arrangement was "consistent with substantial equality,
notwithstanding the technical differences." Id. at 398. He said that the discrimination
issue "was decided in Kidd v. Alabama." Id. (citing 1881 U.S. 730).
308. Fulton, 516 U.S. at 345-46.
309. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 68 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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generations.'"'31  Only Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed any
disagreement with the Court's new thinking. He wrote a one
paragraph concurrence to register his belief that the "substantial
equality" requirement of Darnell would be a "more 'realistic"'
measure of the constitutionality of state taxation of interstate
transactions than the "Court's more recent requirement" of strictest
scrutiny. Nevertheless, he decided to join the Court's opinion
because his "view has not prevailed."3 " The cases decided by the
Court after Fulton seem to guarantee that the view of the Chief
Justice is not likely to prevail in the future. 12
B. Commerce Clause as a Surrogate for the Equal Protection Clause
The Court's refusal to entertain equal protection challenges to
state taxes that discriminate against out-of-state interests marks an
310. Lynn A. Baker & Earnest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 96 (2001).
311. Fulton, 516 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice noted
that he had stated his views in dissent in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 647 (1984)
(quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963)), that "the
'substantial equivalence' test deviates from the principle articulated in earlier cases that
'equality for the purpose of competition and for the plans of commerce' should be
,measured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions.'" Fulton, 516 U.S. at 348.
312. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court found the challenged tax exemption statute not to be violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. 520 U.S. at 570. The State Supreme Court held the exemption statute
"treats all Maine charities alike" - given the fact that "all have the opportunity to qualify
for an exemption by choosing to dispense the majority of their charity locally," and it
"regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 570
(quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 655 A.2d 876, 879
(1995)). The U.S. Supreme Court simply refused to consider the Equal Protection claim,
and defined the issue before the Court as follows: "This case involves an issue that we
have not previously addressed - the disparate real estate tax treatment of a nonprofit
service provider based on the residence of the consumers that it serves." Camps
Newfound, 520 U.S. at 572.
Similarly, in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999), a foreign
corporation sued Alabama alleging that a franchise tax assessed on foreign corporations
violates the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the question of whether the Alabama tax violated the Commerce
Clause. The Court ultimately found the statute "facially discriminatory" and therefore
unconstitutional for failure to justify the tax as a "compensatory tax" as required by
Fulton, 516 U.S. 325. So. Cent. Bell, 526 U.S. at 169-70. The Court stated that "[o]ur cases
hold that a discriminatory tax cannot be upheld as 'compensatory' unless the State proves
that the special burden that the franchise tax imposes upon foreign corporations is
'roughly... approximate' to the special burden on domestic corporations, and that the
taxes are similar enough 'in substance' to serve as 'mutually exclusive' proxies for one
another." Id. at 170 (citing Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 103
(1994), accord, Fulton, 516 U.S. at 332-33).
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unexplained departure from several well-seasoned precedents.
Claims based on the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause are not mutually exclusive for the simple reason that the
constitutional values protected by the two clauses are distinctly
different. The respective spheres in which the Commerce Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause operate in the context of state taxation
are graphically outlined by Justice Powell in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Ward.
13
The case involved an equal protection challenge to Alabama's
domestic preference tax statute,1  which imposed a substantially
higher 'gross premiums tax' on out-of-state insurance companies than
on domestic insurance companies.3 " The statute would have certainly
violated the Commerce Clause 316 but for a federal statute that
specifically immunized State laws which discriminate against out-of-
state insurance companies from Commerce Clause challenges. 7
Alabama argued that the same federal statute should be construed to
immunize its discriminatory tax scheme from equal protection
challenges as well. The state asserted that a contrary approach would
"amount[] to no more than 'Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal
protection clothing' 318 because the federal statute was "intended to
authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in
the insurance field., 319 Thus, the essence of the State's contention was
313. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
314. ALA. CODE §§ 27-4-4, 27-4-5 (1975).
315. Under the domestic preference statute, "a foreign insurance company doing the
same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic competitor." Metro.
Life Ins., 470 U.S. at 871-72.
316. Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to
State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 948 (1986)
("The Alabama statute's discrimination against out-of-state businesses clearly violates the
commerce clause. The McCarren-Ferguson Act, however, removed the commerce clause
barrier to state taxation of the insurance industry." Id. at 948.)
317. The Court had already ruled, in 1981, that the federal statute, McCarren Ferguson
Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et. seq., "explicitly suspended Commerce
Clause restraints on state taxation of insurance and placed insurance regulation firmly
within the purview of the several States." Metro. Life Ins., 470 U.S. at 884 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 655
(1981)).
318. Metro. Life Ins., 470 U.S. at 880 (quoting Brief for Appellee Ward).
319. Id. at 880. In support of its argument, Alabama invoked the Court's decision in
Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648
(1981), in which the Court held that the federal statute immunized from Commerce Clause
challenge the so-called "California retaliatory insurance tax" that discriminated against
out-of-state insurance companies whose home states imposed higher taxes on insurance
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that a valid state purpose which would sustain a discriminatory tax
under the Commerce Clause would be adequate to sustain it under
the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court rejected Alabama's contention by articulating the
divergent scope of the two constitutional provisions:
The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates
local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in
contrast, is concerned with whether a state purpose is
impermissibly discriminatory, whether the discrimination
involves local or other interests are not central to the inquiry to
be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a
legitimate state interest in the Commerce Clause context saxs
nothing about its validity under the equal protection analysis.
The Court further emphasized that any analysis of the permissible
scope of a State's power should take into account the different
functions the two constitutional provisions are designed to perform-
"one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons
from unconstitutional discrimination.... .321 Therefore, two different
constitutional standards are used to scrutinize the validity of a
discriminatory state tax.
Under Commerce Clause analysis, the State's interest, if
legitimate, is weighed against the burden the state law would impose
on interstate commerce. In the equal protection context, however, if
the State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as
long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that
purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish.322
Alabama tried to justify the discriminatory tax, asserting that it
served to promote a legitimate state interest in promoting domestic
companies than California. In the case, the Court also rejected an equal protection
challenge holding that the retaliatory tax law was a rational means to achieve the
legitimate state purpose of promoting the interstate business of domestic insurance
carriers, reasoning that the California tax would discourage other states from imposing
excessive taxes for fear of retribution. Id. at 674. Despite the holding in Western and
Southern Life Insurance, the Court emphasized the "established" constitutional principle
applicable to discriminatory state taxes, thus: "[w]hatever the extent of a State's authority
to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority
does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on foreign
corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination
between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state
purpose." Id. at 667 (quoting Metro. Life Ins., 470 U.S. at 875).
320. Metro. Life Ins., 470 U.S. at 878.
321. Id. at 881.
322. Id.
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insurance companies and encouraging foreign insurance companies to
invest in Alabama. 23 The Court found the proffered justification
insufficient to withstand the equal protection challenge because the
"promotion of domestic business by discriminating against
nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state purpose." '324
In a scathing dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by three other
Justices, denounced Justice Powell's majority opinion.325 However,
the dissent did not dispute the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause to discriminatory state taxes. Rather, the dissenting opinion
focused exclusively on the majority's conclusion that the State's goal
of promoting the domestic insurance industry by using discriminatory
taxes against foreign competitors is not a legitimate purpose that
satisfies the "rational basis test" of the Equal Protection Clause.326
Emphasizing that Congress, by deciding to "elevate local concerns
over interstate competition 3 27 in the insurance industry, had already
exempted state insurance regulations from Commerce Clause
restrictions, Justice O'Connor derided the majority's suggestion "that
a state purpose might be legitimate for purposes of the Commerce
Clause but somehow illegitimate for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause" and "that the purpose's legitimacy, chameleon-like, changes
according to the constitutional clause cited in the complaint. 3 28 She
accused the majority of "fashion[ing] its own brand of economic equal
protection"3 29 that accords little deference to the economic policies
formulated by federal and state legislatures."'
It did not take too long for the Justices to iron out their
differences over what would constitute a legitimate state purpose that
can survive rational basis scrutiny. In Northeast Bancorp., Inc. v.
Board of Governors,33" ' decided the same Term as Metropolitan Life,
the Court unanimously upheld statutes of Massachusetts and
323. Id. at 882.
324. Id. at 882.
325. Id. at 883-903. (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting)
326. Metro. Life Ins., 470 U.S. at 886, 901.
327. Id. at 900.
328. Id. at 895.
329. Id. at 900. The dissenters asserted that with the "new brand," the Court
"supplants a legislative policy endorsed by both Congress and the individual states that
explicitly sanctioned the very parochialism in regulation and taxation of insurance that the
Court's decision holds illegitimate." Id.
330. Id. at 901.
331. 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
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Connecticut that barred acquisition of in-state banks by bank holding
companies from outside the New England region. The statutes were
enacted pursuant to a federal law that lifted all federal restrictions on
interstate bank acquisitions while permitting states to regulate
acquisition of local banks by out-of-state holding companies. The
Court rejected challenges to the state statutes made under both the
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Writing for the
Court, then Justice Rehnquist, after finding that the state statutes
were expressly authorized by the federal law, emphatically declared:
"When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes
are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce
Clause."332
More complex and somewhat convoluted was the Court's reason
to validate the state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court concluded "that the concerns which spurred Massachusetts and
Connecticut to enact the statutes here challenged, different as they
are from those which motivated the enactment of the Alabama
statute in Metropolitan Life, meet the traditional rational basis for
judging equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment." '333 But, as Justice O'Connor asserted in her concurring
opinion, there is "no meaningful distinction for Equal Protection
purposes" '334 between the Alabama statute and the two pertinent
statutes. The Court accomplished the remarkable feat of drawing this
distinction without linking the equal protection issue to the
congressional authorizations of the state regulations. It did so in part
by according overriding significance to the fact that "banking and
related activities are of profound local concern," '335 requiring state
regulation to preserve the independence of local banking institutions
that foster the traditional "close relationship between those in the
community who need credit and those who provide credit." '336
Indicative of its sensitivity to the closeness of the case to
Metropolitan Life, the Court came up with another distinguishing
feature of the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes. It asserted
that the two statutes, unlike the Alabama statute in Metropolitan,
''are not favoring local corporations at the expense of out-of-state
corporations. They are favoring out-of-state corporations domiciled
332. Id. at 174.
333. Id. at 178.
334. Id. at 178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
335. Id. at 177 (quoting Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980)).
336. N.E. Bancorp., 472 U.S. at 178.
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within the New England region over out-of-state corporations from
other parts of the country ... .""' This asserted distinction makes no
difference from the equal protection perspective. The Court certainly
failed to convince Justice O'Connor "why completely barring the
banks of 44 states from doing business is less discriminatory than
Alabama's scheme of taxing the insurance companies from 49 states
at a slightly higher rate.""'
The unanimous decision of the Court in Northeast Bancorp.
vindicates Justice Powell's use of an equal protection analysis in
Metropolitan Life. But the most redeeming feature of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Northeast Bancorp. is its
dissociation from Justice O'Connor's singular view that "where
Congress has sanctioned the barriers to commerce that fostering of
local industries might engender, this Court has no authority under the
Equal Protection Clause to invalidate classifications designed to
encourage local businesses because of their special contributions." '339
Justice O'Connor's proposition simply amounts to judicial
acquiescence to a partial repeal of the Equal Protection Clause by
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause-a proposition
that is likely to encounter several troublesome doctrinal and practical
problems.
As Justice O'Connor correctly stated, "[t]he Commerce Clause is
a flexible tool of economic policy that Congress may use as it sees
fit... [while d]octrines of equal protection are constitutional limits
that constrains the acts of federal and state legislature alike.""34 That
Congress cannot use the equal protection clause as it sees fit was
asserted as an immutable constitutional maxim by none other than
Justice O'Connor. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,3
the Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, held that it was
unconstitutional for the State of Mississippi to operate a nursing
school that admitted only women. Summarily dismissing the State's
argument that it was in compliance with Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 342-which excluded single-sex institutions like
the nursing school from the statute's general prohibition against sex
337. Id. at 177.
338. 472 U.S. at 179 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
339. Id. at 180.
340. 470 U.S. at 901 (citing, as example, California v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)).
341. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
342. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003). Title IX prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex
by educational institutions that receive federal funds.
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discrimination-the Justice stated that "Congress apparently
intended, at most, to exempt MUW from the requirements of Title
IX" because Congress has "no power to restrict, abridge, or dilute" '343
the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice O'Connor has never deviated from her view of limited
congressional power under the Equal Protection Clause.344
It is axiomatic that the Commerce Clause protects interstate
commerce from all forms of protectionist and parochial state policies,
including those manifest in "discriminating State legislation." '345 The
Clause prohibits even seemingly nondiscriminatory state regulations
that impose substantial burdens on out-of-state commercial interests.
But not all such regulations are unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause if, and to the extent, they serve some legitimate
state interest. For instance, a state requirement that a locally grown
fruit be packed in state-approved cartons when the producer could
have packed them in its out-of-state facility at a cheaper cost was
struck down by the Supreme Court, despite a showing that the State
had a legitimate interest in having the high-quality fruit packed under
a label bearing the State's name.346 In an unanimous decision, the
Court held: "Even where the state is pursuing a clearly legitimate
local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared
to be virtually per se illegal." '347
Conversely, there can be instances in which the Equal Protection
Clause provides protection against commercial discrimination that
may not be banned by the Commerce Clause. Williams v. Vermont348
is an example. Vermont required automobile owners to register their
cars in Vermont and pay the appropriate sales or use tax when they,
or their cars, become residents of Vermont. The registrants were
eligible for a credit for out-of-state sales or use tax payments, but only
if they were residents of Vermont at the time they made such out-of-
state payments. Vermont claimed that the credit exemption was
343. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 732-33 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, n.10
(1996)).
344. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
writing for the majority).
345. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 275, 280 (1875).
346. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Fulfilling Arizona's requirement
that cantaloupes grown in Arizona also be crated in Arizona, would cost Bruce Church,
Inc. $200,000 more than packing the fruit at crating facilities outside Arizona. Cantaloupe
crates normally show the names of the state in which the fruit is being packed.
347. Id. at 145.
348. 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
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designed to encourage interstate commerce by enabling Vermont
residents to shop outside the State without penalty. 49  But the
Supreme Court found the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause on
the ground that a credit based solely on the registrant's "residence at
the time of the purchase [was] a wholly arbitrary basis on which to
distinguish among Vermont registrants-at least among those who
used their cars elsewhere before coming to Vermont."35" The Court
declined to consider the legality of the tax under the Commerce
Clause,35" ' presumably because use taxes,352 like state entrance fees,353
are generally exempt from Commerce Clause restrictions.
C. Two Disparate Sets of Anti-Discrimination Principles
The original purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create a
unified national economy by curbing "the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation."35 '  The purpose could not have been achieved
without a vibrant common market unencumbered by state regulations
that burden, restrict, or unduly interfere with the free flow of
interstate commerce. "Our system, fostered by the Commerce
Clause, is that every farmer and craftsman shall be encouraged to
produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market
in the nation.... "355 The system has been nurtured and safeguarded
by a vigilant Supreme Court which shows no hesitation in striking
down state regulations that have even the potential to impede or
349. Id. at 26.
350. Id. at 23.
351. Id. at 27 ("We need not consider appellant's various arguments based on the right
to travel, the privileges and immunities clause, and the Commerce Clause.").
352. The use tax, generally treated as a complement to the sales tax, is considered
necessary to "protect a state's revenues by taking away the advantages to residents of
traveling out of the state to make untaxed purchases and to protect local merchants from
out-of-state competition which, because of its lower or nonexistent tax burdens, can offer
lower prices." Id. at 24 (quoting Leverson v. Conway, 481 A.2d 1029, 1032 (1984)).
353. The Commerce Clause does not prohibit discriminatory entrance fees imposed on
out-of-state corporations seeking to enter a state to engage in intrastate business. See Atl.
Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937). See also Tatarowicz, supra note 316, at 946
("The equal protection clause however, may be the strongest barrier to discriminatory
entrance fees, because the commerce clause affords little protection to foreign
corporations seeking to enter a state to conduct an intrastate business.").
354. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
355. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (Justice Jackson, J.,
writing for the majority).
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restrict interstate commerce. Under the Court fashioned "dormant"
Commerce Clause, congressional legislation has never been a
prerequisite for judicial enforcement. The Court reasoned that
"[a]lthough the language of th[e] Clause speaks only of Congress'
power over commerce, the Court long has recognized that it also
limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade."'356
The rdison d'etre of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is
the need for prompt judicial action to remove state barriers against
interstate trade. State barriers that restrict or burden interstate
commerce can manifest themselves in different forms and varying
intensities. Some of them may be in the form of discrimination. The
dormant Commerce Clause "prohibits economic protectionism-that
is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests
by burdening out-of-state competitors." '357 "Even a nondiscriminatory
regulation may nonetheless impose an excessive burden on interstate
trade when considered in relation to the local benefits conferred.""35
Nevertheless, under the dormant Commerce Clause regime, the
Court singles out discriminatory state laws for special scrutiny. If
what the Court looks for in the review of state laws are barriers to
interstate commerce, it should not make any difference whether such
barriers are erected through discriminatory or nondiscriminatory
laws. This difference is intriguing in light of the Court's entire anti-
discrimination apparatus. After decades of collaborative co-
existence, the dormant Commerce Clause is now completely
separated from the Equal Protection Clause. Why does the Court
want to keep the dormant Commerce Clause equal protection-free?
The reason is not apparent. But on closer examination, it is not
difficult to identify several likely reasons.
356. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (1991) (internal quotation omitted)
(emphasis added).
357. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (citing Bachus Imps., Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270-273 (1984); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880); etc.).
358. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 405 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In Carbone, for instance, the town required all solid waste to be processed at
a designated transfer station before leaving the town. The purpose of the requirement was
"to retain the processing fees charged at the transfer station to amortize the cost of the
facility." Id. at 386. Justice O'Connor found no "facial or effective discrimination against
interstate commerce," contrary to what Justice Kennedy found, but she maintained that
the law was invalid "because it imposes an excessive burden on interstate commerce." Id.
at 401. But Justice Souter, joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun,
dissented, maintaining that through the requirement the town was trying to solve its
garbage problem, that it did not discriminate between local and out-of-town participants
in the private market for trash disposal services, and that it was not protectionist in its
purpose or effect. Id. at 411-30.
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What fuels the drive to extricate the Equal Protection Clause
from the dormant Commerce Clause is the Court's desire to develop
two distinct sets of anti-discrimination principles - one suitable mostly
for people and the other for commercial interests. Saddled with
inflexible review standards and overly-narrow parameters of
discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause has become increasingly
unpalatable to the Court for use in resolving disputes involving
interstate commercial interests. It is this judicially created impotency
of modern equal protection jurisprudence that prompted the Court to
devise a parallel set of more effective anti-discrimination rules under
the dormant Commerce Clause.
1. Standard of Review
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a state law can be subjected
to "strict scrutiny" only if it restricts "fundamental rights" or it
contains "suspect classifications" based on race, ethnicity, alienage or
national origin.359 A state law subject to strict scrutiny will not be
sustained unless the state demonstrates that its restrictions or
classifications are "narrowly tailored to further [a compelling state]
interest.""36  Social and economic legislation that does not contain
"suspect [classifications or] infringe fundamental constitutional rights
must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification."36' Highly deferential to state objectives,
rational basis review accords state laws a strong presumption of
constitutionality.362 Reviewed under the rationality test, economic
classifications in state laws that discriminated against interstate
commerce were upheld on the mere showing that the classifications
rested "upon a state of fact that reasonably can be conceived to
constitute a distinction or difference in state policy. .,,16 Realizing
that the acceptance of state law discrimination on such flimsy grounds
had not always adequately served the interests of interstate
commerce, the Court seemed to search for viable alternatives. At
359. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (race); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (fundamental rights).
360. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
361. Fed. Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993).
362. Id. at 314.
363. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
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times, the Court used "a covertly tightened variety of minimum
rationality, in order to avoid expressly deciding whether heightened
scrutiny was warranted."'36
It was clear that the addition of commercial discrimination to the
categories of classifications that trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause was not a practical and feasible option. Any
expansion of the strict scrutiny categories would be an unstoppable
catalyst for the revival of claims by women and the disabled that
discrimination against them should be subjected to heightened or
strict scrutiny. The Court had rejected such claims in the past. For
instance, in Frontiero v. Richardson , the Court declined to decide
whether sex was a "suspect" criterion for legislative classification that
warrants strict scrutiny, even though a plurality of four Justices
endorsed strict scrutiny, reasoning that "throughout much of the
nineteenth century the position of women in our society was in many
respects comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave
codes. 3 66  Likewise, the Court has consistently refused to apply
heightened or strict scrutiny to classifications based on disability,
even after the Congress designated disabled persons as "a discrete
and insular minority."36  Given the potential problems associated
with widening strict scrutiny categories, it made sense to find a
separate strict scrutiny home for commercial discrimination outside
the limited confines of the Equal Protection Clause. Nevertheless, it
364. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1442, n.16 (2d ed. 1978)
(citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472
U.S. 612 (1985)). Tribe states that review under the rational basis test "took on a new,
more penetrating character" when the Court, in Zobel and Hooper, "struck down
economic legislation while purporting to employ only rational basis review." TRIBE, supra
at 1444.
365. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
366. Id. at 685. (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment). Powell found a determination about strict scrutiny unnecessary in light of the
Equal Rights Amendment that was up for ratification at the time of the Court's decision.
Id. at 692. Currently, sex classifications are subject to "intermediate scrutiny." Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 722 (1982). Even the ardent and consistent
proponent of gender equality, Justice Ginsburg, stopped short of pressing for strict
scrutiny, settling instead for "skeptical scrutiny," in her own opinion for the Court in
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
367. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
368. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USCA § 12101(a)(7)(2003).
Status as a "discrete and insular minority" has been considered as a qualifying criterion for
strict scrutiny. The criterion originated from the famous footnote 4 of the decision in
United States v. Caroline Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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remains an anomaly that commercial discrimination is subject to
strictest scrutiny while discriminations on the basis of sex and
disability are not.
2. Discrimination Criteria
In an Equal Protection-free dormant Commerce Clause,
discrimination is a free-wheeling idea. There are no set rules or
analytical framework to determine whether a state statute is
discriminatory. The Court's controversial determination that the
Maine statute involved in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town
of Harrison was facially discriminatory is an appropriate illustration.69
The statute gave a full property tax exemption to benevolent and
charitable institutions incorporated in Maine and operated principally
for the benefit of Maine residents. Institutions that were operated
principally for non-residents were given a partial exemption under
specified conditions. Defending the legality of the statute, the State
argued that the exemption was designed to compensate private
charities for helping to relieve the State of its burden of caring for its
residents. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld the statute
under an equal protection analysis... on the ground that "the
exemption statute 'treats all Maine charities alike' - given the fact that
'all have the opportunity to qualify for an exemption by choosing to
dispense the majority of their charity locally.""'37 The state court also
reasoned that the exemption was the equivalent of a purchase of the
exempt charity's services by the State-a perfectly legal undertaking
under the dormant Commerce Clause37-- and that the statute
regulated "evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate
commerce."
373
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, found that "the
Maine statute facially discriminates against interstate commerce, 374
because "[a]s a practical matter, the statute encourages affected
entities to limit their out-of-state clientele, and penalizes the
369. See 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
370. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 655 A.2d 876, 879-80 (Me.
1995) (citing Green Acre Baha'i Inst. v. Town of Eliot, 193 A.2d 564 (1963)).
371. Id. at 879 (quoted in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 570).
372. When a state is in the interstate market as a purchaser of services rather than as a
regulator, the transaction would be exempted from commerce clause restrictions under the
"market participant exemption" to the dormant Commerce Cause. See Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
373. Camps Newfound, 655 A.2d. at 879.
374. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581.
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principally nonresident customers of businesses catering to a
primarily interstate market." '375 Four dissenting Justices vehemently
disagreed. In his dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, Justice Scalia made a
persuasive argument that the disparate treatment of the resident-
benefiting and non-resident-benefiting charities did not constitute
discrimination-and certainly not facial discrimination-for the
simple reason that they were not similarly situated."'
The Court's discrimination analysis is faulty for additional
reasons. First, what the Court condemns as discriminatory here is a
generally applicable neutral statute-neutral in the sense that any
charitable organization incorporated in the State of Maine could seek
and receive the property tax exemption provided it meets the criteria
for receiving the exemption. The relevant criterion for denial of the
exemption is service "principally for the benefit of persons who are
not Maine residents." '377 If the statute produced a disparate impact on
non-residents or non-resident benefiting charities, the Court should
have evaluated its constitutionality under a test similar to the one it
uses under the Equal Protection Clause in like situations. Under the
Equal Protection standard, a generally applicable neutral statute that
produces disparate impact would not be treated as discriminatory
absent proof of discriminatory "purpose or intent." '378 Discriminatory
purpose implies that the legislature or decisionmaker had "selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect upon an identifiable
group." '379 If claims of discriminatory effect or disparate impact from
the Maine statute are evaluated under the purpose test, the claims
would fail because the obvious purpose of the statute is to facilitate
the rendering of charitable services to Maine residents and not to
penalize non-residents or non-resident-benefitting charities."
375. Id. at 576.
376. Id. at 601-03.
377. ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 36, § 652 (1)(A) (Supp. 1996); Camps Newfound, 520
U.S. at 569 n.2.
378. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
379. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). It should be noted that
the Court requires proof of motive or purpose to judge the constitutionality of a neutral
statute of general applicability that produces a discriminatory effect or disparate impact
"under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." See, e.g., Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
380. As Justice Scalia stated in his dissent, limiting state-provided social services to its
own citizens would not constitute discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
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Second, the Court's failure to assess the burden that the statute is
claimed to have imposed on non-residents or non-resident-catering
charities is totally inconsistent with the very rationale of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Instead of conjuring up the imaginary
discrimination, the Court should have focused its inquiry on the
extent to which the tax exemption statute burdens or restricts
interstate commerce. The Town of Harrison challenged the premise
of the Court's decision that the denial of the tax exemption to non-
resident-benefiting charities would force them to charge such high
fees as to deter out-of-staters from utilizing their high-cost services.
The challenger of the statute presented no evidence to show that any
non-resident was so deterred. But the Court maintained that a
"particularized showing of the sort [the town] seeks is not required" ''
because under the dormant Commerce Clause "actual discrimination,
wherever it is found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope
of the discrimination have no bearing on the determinative question
whether discrimination has occurred. 3 82  But the Court seems to
ignore the fact that the pertinent inquiry here is to ascertain whether
discrimination has occurred.
To assign such decisive and unexcepted significance to
discrimination is to elevate form over substance. Irrespective of the
form in which it may manifest, a state action should be considered
violative of the Commerce Clause if, and only if, it constitutes a
restriction or burden on interstate commerce. The blindly formulaic
condemnation of a state law on the basis of actual or suspected
discrimination, regardless of its adverse effect on interstate
commerce, would be an affront to state sovereignty and a disservice
to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine itself.
3. Hypocritical Extremism
The Court's hypersensitivity to commercial discrimination is
truly paradoxical in several respects. First, the hypersensitivity shown
in the majority opinion in Camps Newfound was that of Justice
Stevens, who, in a different context, had emphasized the truism that
Therefore, it should also be legal to arrange for the rendering of such services by state-
subsidized charities. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 605-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citing
Bd. of Educ. v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553 (1906)).
381. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581 n.15.
382. Id. at 581 n.15 (quoting Assoc. Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 650 (1994)). The
Court also repeated the court-made maxim that "there is no 'de minimis' defense to a
charge of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause." Camps Newfound, 520
U.S. at 581 n.15 (citing Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1996)).
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"[t]he Constitution is clearly silent on the subject of state legislation
that discriminates against interstate commerce."3 3  Moreover, in
Fulton, three of the Justices subscribed to the idea that the Court
"need not know how unequal the Tax is before concluding that it
unconstitutionally discriminates"3"  despite believing that "[t]he
negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable
in application." '385 They despised the negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence which took the Court "well beyond the invalidation of
obviously discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce" ''  and
challenged the rationale for its continued existence.387
Second, the Court's discrimination theory of the dormant
Commerce Clause has become a doctrinal anomaly in its emerging
federalism jurisprudence. In obeisance to state sovereignty, the
Court has condoned inordinate amounts of state discrimination in
non-commercial contexts, even in defiance of federal anti-
discrimination laws. In University of Alabama v. Garrett,8 for
example, the Court, with no compunction, utilized a variety of
ostentatious techniques to let the States discriminate against disabled
persons. It ruled that state laws that discriminate against the disabled
"incur[] only the minimum 'rational-basis' review applicable to
general social and economic legislation,"389 and therefore could be
justified by "any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis" for the disparate treatment." The Court
insisted that Congress cannot ban state discrimination that would not
even survive rational basis review unless there is proof of a pattern of
such unconstitutional discrimination. Finally, the Court found the
congressional record that contained "roughly 300 examples of
383. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 797 n.12 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., writing for the majority.).
384. Fulton., 516 U.S. at 334 n.3 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760
(1981)).
385. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., & Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
386. Id. at 618.
387. Id. at 612 (stating that it is "worth revisiting the underlying justifications for our
involvement in the negative aspects of the Commerce Clause, and the compelling
arguments demonstrating why those justifications are illusory").
388. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
389. Id. at 366.
390. Id. at 367.
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discrimination by state governments" '' against the disabled "[fell] far
short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination" '392 that was required to sustain the federal legislation
banning state employment discrimination against the disabled. Using
exactly the same synthetic review formula, the Court had previously
invalidated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to free the
States from the shackles of federal restrictions on discrimination
against the elderly.393
It is ironic that the Supreme Court rejected the federal statutes
banning state discrimination against the disabled and the elderly for
the avowed purpose of protecting state sovereignty while it shows no
similar concern or respect for state sovereignty as it ruthlessly applies
court-made anti-discrimination rules under the dormant Commerce
Clause. The austerely lethal strictest scrutiny is applied to guillotine
even marginally discriminatory tax policies of the States without
giving due regard to the fact that "[tihe power of taxation is
indispensable to their existence." '9 The Court's utter disregard of the
allegedly discriminatory state tax law's impact on interstate
commerce is even more appalling. The Court not only refuses to
quantify the burden or restraint that a discriminatory state law might
impose on interstate commerce,395 but it flatly declares that there is no
"'de minimis' defense to a charge of discriminatory taxation under the
Commerce Clause.,
396
The Court's zealous adherence to strictest scrutiny inevitably
shines the spotlight on its persistent efforts to undermine the
effectiveness of the equal protection principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Of course, the Court's determination to prevent "even
the smallest scale discrimination [that] can interfere with the project
of our Federal Union"'3 97 may be justified by the lessons of history.
391. Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
392. Id. at 370. ("The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show
that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in
employment against the disabled." Id. at 368).
393. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
394. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1,199 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall made
this observation in the course of his discussion of the powers of Congress (in relation to
state sovereignty) under the Commerce Clause.
395. Assoc. Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 649 (1994) (8-1 decision)(Thomas, J.,
writing for the majority ) ("[o]n the contrary, as a general matter we have rejected reliance
on any calculus that requires quantification of discrimination as a preliminary step to
determining whether the discrimination is valid").
396. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581 n.15 (quoting Fulton, 516 U.S. at 333 n.3).
397. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 595 ("The history of our Commerce Clause
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One need not oppose the strict anti-discrimination principles of the
dormant Commerce Clause to support the argument that the Court's
interpretation of the anti-discrimination principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment should be more fair and humane. The Court cannot
correct the moral compass of its equal protection jurisprudence by the
simple expedient of declaring it inoperative in the field of interstate
commercial discrimination.
4. The Extra Legal Factor
Most critics who are troubled by the string of decisions
invalidating federal anti-discrimination laws tend to attribute
perceived constitutional improprieties to the Rehnquist Court's
dogmatic adherence to federalism and state sovereignty.398  As
explained in the last segment of this article, the Court's fervor for
state sovereignty has unconditionally yielded to commercial and
corporate interests, at least in the area of interstate commercial
discrimination. Even some staunch defenders of federalism principles
think that "[t]he Rehnquist Court lacks a coherent federalism
philosophy." '399 It is significant that not everyone is buying the
federalism rationale. Professor Jed Rubenfeld, for instance, pierced
the federalism veil and found, in the Court's escapades, "an
underlying agenda, founded on a deeply held but as yet poorly
theorized sense that anti-discrimination law in this country has taken
a very wrong turn."" However, this agenda turns ugly, and even un-
American, when the Rehnquist Court pushes it at the expense of "the
disabled individuals Congress sought to protect. 4 0' That is what the
Court did in Garrett. What impelled the Chief Justice of the United
jurisprudence has shown that even the smallest scale discrimination can interfere with the
project of our Federal Union").
398. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
399. Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 518
(2002). Professor Massey defends federalism thus: "There are good reasons to maintain
federalism and sound reasons that the judiciary should be involved in the effort.
Federalism promotes individual liberty, collective autonomy, and political responsibility
through citizen involvement and accountability to citizens." Id. at 516.
400. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1177
(2002).
401. Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 316 (2001) ("The Garrett Court overrode
[Congress'] power in the name of sovereign immunity. In so doing, it was not so much
protecting the States against federal encroachment, as protecting one federal power at the
expense of another, the judiciary at the expense of the legislature. In the end, the price
will be paid not just by Congress, but by the disabled individuals Congress sought to
protect.")
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States to give the green light to the States to drive their so-called
rational employment policies over the disabled "quite
hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly" without pausing to
"make allowance for the disabled 40 2 as desired by Congress? It is
impossible to pinpoint the precise reason.
In four cases, besides Garrett, Chief Justice Rehnquist has had
occasion to express his own views on the rights or interests of the
disabled as embodied in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 3  In
each of them, the position taken by the Chief Justice, either in
support of the Court's decision or in opposition to it, has not been
favorable to the disabled °.4 4  The overall profile of thirty-three
disability cases brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
decided during the Chief Justice's tenure on the Court presents a
disturbing picture. While in twenty-five of these cases the Justice has
participated in decisions going against the interests of the disabled, 4,5
402. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-68 (2001).
403. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources,
532 U.S. 598 (2001); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
404. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care, 532 U.S. at 602-605 (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the
majority) (interpretting the fee-shifting provisions of the ADA which allow attorney's fees
to a prevailing party, as not encompassing the "catalyst theory" which generally "allows
courts to award attorney's fees to civil rights plaintiffs who catalyze a defendant's change
of conduct, even if litigation does not reach a final judgment"); Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 647
(Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (disagreeing with the part of the Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion which held that asymptomatic HIV infection "is an impairment that substantially
limits the major life activity of reproduction" and therefore it fits the ADA's definition of
disability); Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (writing against the
majority opinion, supported by seven Justices, that the discharge of a school teacher with a
history of infectious tuberculosis solely by reason of her illness, violated the federal
Rehabilitation Act because the teacher was a "handicapped person" within the meaning of
the Act); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp, 451 U.S. at 10-11, 22 (Rehnquist, J., writing for the
majority) (reversing the decision of the Third Circuit which held that, under the federal
Developmentally Disabled Assistance Act of 1975, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
mentally retarded persons in a state-run, federally-assisted rehabilitation facility had a
judicially enforceable substantive right to "appropriate treatment, services, and
rehabilitation").
405. There are twenty-seven cases in which Rehnquist has participated in deciding
against the interests of the disabled. A further breakdown of these cases is as follows:
Rehnquist participated seven times in unanimous decisions going against the interests of
the disabled. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); and Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Five times as part of a seven Justice majority. See U.S.
Airways v Barnett, 535 U.S 391 (2002); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516
(1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187
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he has joined decisions in favor of the disabled in only six cases."'
Noticeably, the Chief Justice has never dissented from a decision
going against the disabled.
Seen from the backdrop of the pattern of disability decisions in
which he has participated, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Garrett is not out of the ordinary. It is perfectly in line with the tenor
of his views expressed in, or fairly inferrable from, the scores of the
Court's decisions that are adverse to the interests of the disabled.
The positions taken by the Chief Justice in disability cases prior to
Garrett may exude less than ideal sympathy to the plight of the
disabled, but they do not necessarily imply that he is inflexibly
predisposed to rule indiscriminately against the disabled. His views
on disability may well be animated by his philosophical leanings or be
the product of pure rational thinking. However, the Chief Justice's
anti-disability positions in prior cases are seldom claimed to have
been impelled by his overwhelming concern for state sovereignty or
dictated by the doctrinal imperatives of the proportionality standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
The five Justices who are hell-bent on engrafting the standard of
strict proportionality to the Fourteenth Amendment have
consistently found the standard non-viable under the Eighth
(1996); and Cmty. Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983). Six times as part of a six
Justice majority. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988); U.S. Dept. of Trans. v.
Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597 (1986); Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936 (1985); Smith
v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981); and N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). Four times as part of a
five Justice majority. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of, Health &
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garnett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); and Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). On three occasions, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has dissented from decisions favoring the disabled. Once as part of a two
Justice minority. See Sch. Bd.. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), and twice as part of a three
Justice minority. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) and Olmstead v.
L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
406. In six cases, Rehnquist has joined decisions in favor of the disabled, five times as
part of a unanimous court. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999);
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Penn. Dep't of Corrs. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); and
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch; 451 U.S. 390 (1981). Once (in favor of the famous golfer,
Casey Martin) as part of a seven Justice majority. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.
661 (2001). Finally, the unanimous outcome in Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977), is
difficult to characterize as favorable or unfavorable. The Chief Justice did not participate
in Bowen v. American Hospital Assoc., 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
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Amendment. 47 As we see in Part III', even those among them who
espouse the standard in some attenuated form408 apply it "only [to]
extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.,
40 1
The inherent subjectivity of the strict proportionality standard is
blamed for its unsuitability in judging claims of unconstitutionality
under the Eighth Amendment. The opponents of strict
proportionality, including Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, believe
that a "conclusion by five Justices that... one offense has less
'gravity' than another is nothing other than a bald substitution of
individual subjective moral values for those of the legislature. 4 10
Justice O'Connor is particularly emphatic that "[w]ithout objective
criteria on which to rely, almost any decision regarding
proportionality will be a matter of personal preference.
' '4
1
None of these obvious and glaring flaws in the concept of strict
proportionality were explained or even acknowledged when the
Justices decided to make it the touchstone for the constitutionality of
enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. If there
is a natural home for the principle of strict proportionality in the
Constitution, it is the Eighth Amendment. If the principle is
inappropriate for the Eighth Amendment, it should be more so for
the Fourteenth Amendment. There is nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment's text or history that even remotely suggests its framers
ever envisioned the prospect of latching a proportionality standard
onto the Amendment.
At its core, the proportionality standard is inherently amorphous
and undefinable. The Court has not proffered any objective and
determinate criteria or guideline that the Congress can depend on
with a sense of certainty and confidence. The Court seems to make
up, on an ad hoc basis, a series of "narrow tailoring" requirements
that are difficult for Congress to follow. For instance, the
407. The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia flatly rejected the proportionality principle in
any kind or form, by stating that the "Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
guarantee." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
408. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy subscribed to the idea of "narrow
proportionality." Id. at 966. All five Justices, including Justice Thomas, adopted the
"gross proportionality" standard, and rejected "strict proportionality" in the context of the
Excessive Fines Clause. See Bajakajian v. United States, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).
409. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor and Souter, J.J.,
concurring).
410. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, C.J., joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, & White, JJ., dissenting).
411. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 480-81 (1993) (O'Connor,
J., joined by White & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
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requirement that Congress establish a "pattern" of unconstitutional
conduct to justify enforcement of civil rights legislation against the
States conspicuously fails to specify what would constitute an
acceptable "pattern." Even more onerous is the requirement that
Congress compile and present evidence of unspecified quantity and
quality before a federal judge to establish the elusive 'pattern.'
Underlying this requirement are the naive assumptions that all the
multifarious concerns and considerations that motivate our elected
representatives in Congress to make legislative decisions can be
neatly recorded in legislative documents and that the legislators'
accumulated experience and expertise, gained through constant
communications and interaction with their constituents, can be
condensed easily in court briefs which are read by judges who have
virtually no interaction with the public at large. Not long ago, a well-
respected and sensible conservative Justice reminded the Court that
the constitutional role of Congress, in contradistinction to that of the
judiciary, "is to be representative rather than impartial, to make
policy rather than to apply settled principles of law"4 '2 and that to
require Congress to make specific factual findings would be "an
unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a
coordinate branch of Government.,
41 3
The proportionality standard remains an incoherent barrier to
effective enforcement of prophylactic anti-discrimination measures
because they are rendered unenforceable against the States until the
discriminatory practices of the States become so widespread and
pervasive as to ripen into an imaginary 'pattern.' The Supreme
Court, by imposing such artificial constraints on Congress, seems to
ignore the fundamental truism "that in no organ of government, state
or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power
than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with
competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.,
41 4
The Court's intimation that the 'proportionality' constraint on
Congress is compelled by concern for state sovereignty belies the
Court's long-standing practice of disregarding such concern in the
interest of protecting interstate commerce from State
discrimination.415 Moreover, concern for state sovereignty cannot
412. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
413. Id. at 503.
414. Id. at 483-84 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
415. The Court's professed concern for state sovereignty was rendered even less
credible when it utilized the proportionality standard to invalidate the Violence Against
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stultify or subordinate the powers of Congress under the Fourteenth
Amendment, because as the Court in City of Boerne acknowledged,
congressional enforcement has always been expected to "intrude[]
into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
States.
,,416
The standard of strict proportionality is irreconcilably at odds
with the fundamental premise of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Amendment embodies the "'central idea' of the Republic," that all
men are created equal, and it incorporates "equality as an
independent right" into the Constitution.417 The Court has
consciously or inadvertently belittled and undervalued the central
idea of the Republic by adopting an indeterminate and amorphous
standard that has no grounding in the Constitution. By doing so, the
Court, to paraphrase Justice Frankfurter,4 8 is sliding from the narrow
confines of its Article III authority into the more spacious domain of
policy exclusively entrusted by the Constitution to our national
legislature. Since the five "proportionality Justices" are not
accountable to, or concerned with, the will of the nation's electorate,
the best that the minorities and the disabled who are victims of State
discrimination can hope for is a remission in dogmatic conservatism at
the Supreme Court during which the Justices could lucidly consider
removing the blemish of proportionality from the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Women Act in spite of the pleas of thirty-six States and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico to not protect their sovereignty at the expense of the victims of gender-motivated
violence for whose protection the Act was enacted by the Congress. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 (2000) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting). The dissenters also noted that, apart from the States, the National
Association of Attorneys General unanimously supported the enforcement of the Act. Id.
at 653. The record in the case left no doubt that many states maintain gender-biased
systems of criminal enforcement.
416. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445,455 (1976)).
417. Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 361, 409-10
(1993).
418. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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